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Abstract
It is often assumed that since Marx and Nietzsche were both anti-religious thinkers, religion played
no part in the formulation of their philosophical outlooks. With this assumption, the influence of
historical religions on rhetoric has received a subordinate role, if at all, in the discourse on 19 th
century German critiques of those very religions. Although differing fundamentally in the debate
on inclusiveness versus individuality, this essay asserts that Marx and Nietzsche, both from
families of religious scholars, broke with previous philosophical tradition and utilized a religious
form of rhetoric in their writings to combat doctrines of human deficiency inherent in previous
European thought. Through an analysis of passages of Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der
Moral and Also sprach Zarathustra and of Das Kapital, the Manifest der kommunistischen Partei,
and other writings, this paper will demonstrate the appropriation of religious rhetoric of human
sufficiency in such works. Secondly, this essay posits the necessity of “slave morality,” as
described by Nietzsche, to the awakening of the proletariat in Marxist political theory, and
characterizes Marx as the final “priest” figure who redirects ressentiment back onto oppressors.
This analysis ultimately shows the effectiveness of the tradition of religious rhetoric of
oppression/liberation, in spite of its simultaneous harsh critiques, and the emotional power of
persuasion inherent and necessary in such language to restore human sufficiency. This essay
further displays the intersections of the works of Nietzsche and Marx as products of 19 th century
German cultural criticism.
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I. Introduction
In 2014 in the Montenegrin city of Podgorica, the Serbian Orthodox Church consecrated
the Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ, which, amid New Testament scenes of Jesus Christ,
features a fresco depicting scenes of eternal punishment of wrongdoers in hell. Among those
represented in the fresco is the Croatian-born communist Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito. Such
a depiction is understandable considering the country’s recent collective memory of Montenegro
as part of Yugoslavia with Tito ruling autocratically as first president and of the collapse of
communism in Serbia and Montenegro in 1991. More curious, however, are the depictions of Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels, which appear next to Tito’s likeness, all viewing a hellish creature
consuming others as punishment.1 While it is understandable why Tito appears in the fresco, the
painter curiously represents Marx and Engels as the philosophical “representatives” of multiple
ideologies which shaped Eastern Europe in the 20th century, mixing religious imagery with recent
history. Much of the controversy at the time, however, lay in how new Eastern European regimes
suppressed religious authorities to make way for such ideologies: the anonymous painter thus
depicts Marx, Engels, and Tito as representatives of these ideologies which deserve eternal
punishment, as conflicts had long persisted between European communist regimes in the 20th
century and suppressed religious authorities. Therefore, it may even seem natural that Marx and
Engels are depicted alongside Tito, considering how such an anti-religious movement shaped the
last century in Eastern Europe. However, considering the status of Marx and Engels as “atheist”
thinkers who disliked and discouraged religious practices as contrary to progress, it is possible that
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a Judeo-Christian framework of thought shaped the ideology of Marxism, considering the lessthan-glorious reputation it has left behind in Europe.
Although Marx and Nietzsche criticized religion as the primary detriment to humankind
and professed their own personal atheistic beliefs, both thinkers ultimately drew upon the rhetoric
and framework of the very religious institutions they criticized to call their readers to action against
religious doctrines of human deficiency and effect new conditions of thought in which human
beings could act as their own “gods.” It is not only necessary to examine the theological debate
within which Marx and Nietzsche developed their ideas about human sufficiency. I believe it also
necessary to examine the religious-based rhetoric of Marx and Nietzsche to re-examine the way in
which we categorize thinkers both as “atheists” and as existing in a “post-Christian” era. Such an
analysis will also examine the complicated yet underrated relationship between the influence of
the actual religious institutions of Europe and the philosophical break with such religions in the
19th century in the German context in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. The
analyses of the functions of the “religious” in Marx’s and Nietzsche’s writings also imply the
possibility that a specifically religious feeling can exist and aid human beings outside and unbound
by contemporary religious institutions per se; I define “religion” and “religious” here as ritual
rather than belief-based; not only is the “religious” a tool of self-actualization, it is a framework
of molding the world to increase the satisfaction of humankind.
Writing in an albeit rhetorical tone, the German-American theologian and Existentialist
philosopher Paul Tillich once made the bold claim that “no philosopher living within Western
Christian culture can deny his dependence on [historical Christianity], as no Greek philosopher
could have hidden his dependence on an Apollonian-Dionysian culture, even if he was a radical

2

critic of the gods of Homer.”2 One such “critic of the gods of Homer” was Friedrich Nietzsche,
whose openly vehement statements against Christianity still add to his reputation as perhaps the
atheist thinker of the 19th century. Nietzsche, a classical philologist, never fully rejected the power
and uses of God and the gods (particularly the Greek pantheon). Tillich’s claim is indeed
controversial and politicizes the history of Europe to fit Christian theology, considering the
plethora of “atheist” German philosophers appearing in 19th-century Europe, in particular
Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, Marx, and Nietzsche. In the centuries preceding Marx and Nietzsche,
however, philosophy was largely a discipline which reinforced the belief in God and, in a material
sense, reinforced the reigning religious body in Europe, the Roman Catholic Church. European
philosophy, therefore, did not exist within a vacuum but was rather an appendage and
“handmaiden” to the Church in which philosophers contemplated God’s nature and humankind’s
relation to him. Nevertheless, as thinkers gradually secularized the discipline of philosophy, it led
many, including Marx and Nietzsche, to an atheistic Weltanschauung; that is, it was an outlook
which did not acknowledge the existence of a deity. However, their own personal atheistic views
do not necessarily mean that once the idea of “God” was absent from European philosophy that
the religious framework and rhetoric which had influenced European thought had disappeared.
The target of Marx and Nietzsche consisted of the human structures which reinforce the
idea of man’s deficiency, not solely the concrete social and religious institutions of their day in
Germany, but rather how such doctrines became systematic within apparatuses of thought in
European history, such as religious institutions. I adopt here the language used by Daniel W.
Conway in his essay “Solving the Problem of Socrates: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra as Political Irony,”
in which he classifies Socratic philosophers as engaging with a presupposed notion of a deficient
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human nature; the terms deficiency and sufficiency thus denote how philosophers describe human
nature.3 The classical precedent of such “doctrines” of deficiency in the Christian sense is the idea
of the “Fall” of humankind recorded in the book of Genesis, in which God deemed human beings
undeserving of the paradise he had provided them. It is human beings in the Christian tradition
who inherit and create the own conditions of their deficiency; that is, that human beings are not
“complete” beings, and the Christian doctrine of original sin enforces such a belief. While the
Roman Catholic tradition characterizes original sin as a deficiency which humans can reconcile
with God, Protestant thinkers such as John Calvin placed an even greater emphasis on the idea of
deficiency, describing it even as total depravity from God. Marx and Nietzsche, contemplating
this question, considered such doctrines of human deficiency to be detrimental to human beings,
in that these doctrines splinter human nature and separate humans from their core “powers.” Marx
deemed such a splintering “alienation” (Entfremdung), and Nietzsche explored this idea of
alienation through religion in his polemical text, Zur Genealogie der Moral. In Marx’s own
development as a thinker, investigating religious alienation was the precedent for his later concept
of alienated labor, and I hold that the idea of alienation influenced how Nietzsche later formulated
the ways in which to break the chain of original sin and deficiency among human beings in
societies shaped by Christianity.
Nevertheless, one cannot assert that both men fully gave up the idea of religion as a tool
and framework to call others to self-reflect and act in the political arena. I argue that the JudeoChristian tradition of thought, as Tillich stated, “haunted” the thought of Marx and Nietzsche, and
their philosophical analyses cannot be understood outside such a framework. Whereas one may
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consider Marx and Nietzsche “atheist” philosophers, one may not consider them philosophers fully
without religion or the religious idea, i.e. a metaphysical framework in which human beings
understand their existence and a framework which functions as a tool of self-actualization. For
Marx, the teleology of scientific socialism suited the process of history, in which human beings
could one day realize their full potential. If such socialism is scientific (“scientific” here meaning
“occurring inevitably”), Marx’s career as a revolutionary seems trivial. Nietzsche, on the other
hand, although by no means egalitarian in his vision, utilized the language of the Lutheran pulpit
and the Platonic dialogue to frame his Zarathustra, both his attempt to criticize Christianity’s
effects and to propose a new type of fully-encapsulated human being, the Übermensch. Nietzsche
himself even suggests our own possible divinity as a remedy for the tragic death of God in Die
fröhliche Wissenschaft: “Ist nicht die Größe dieser Tat [killing God] zu groß für uns? Müssen wir
nicht selber zu Göttern werden, um nur ihrer würdig zu erscheinen?”4
I will first argue that Nietzsche, as an opponent of nihilistic trends in the philosophy of his
day, proposed a pathway to a religious feeling inherent in his texts and his description of the
godless “void” in the modern world by advocating the reunification of the otherworldly with the
worldly. Then, I will examine to what degree Marx utilized pre-existing eschatological views of
history to shape his philosophy of the future and argue how Marx uses religiously influenced
rhetoric to effect social change. I will concentrate mostly on the younger Marx, as he engaged with
religion primarily at the beginning of his academic career, as he owed his idea of alienated labor
to the alienation in religion described by contemporary German philosophers in the early 19th
century. Finally, I will examine to what extent Nietzsche’s description of traditional Christian
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morality in Zur Genealogie der Moral can illuminate the religious aspects of Marxism and how
ressentiment as described by Nietzsche provided the basis for Marxism as a social movement.

6

II. The Lives of Marx and Nietzsche within the German Religious Landscape
Marx was born into a Jewish family in Trier and raised in the Protestant faith, although
Marx’s paternal and maternal lines had both supplied rabbis for several European cities in the
past.5 McLellan has stated in his classic text on Marx’s early life, Marx before Marxism: “It would
be difficult to find anyone who had a more Jewish ancestry than Karl Marx. . . It would be quite
mistaken to dismiss the influence of this immense tradition on Karl Marx. To assert that ‘it is
impossible to say that his Jewish origin had any influence on any part of his life’ betrays a facile
disregard for both Marx’s heredity and his environment.”6 Marx’s grandfather, Marx Levy
Mordechai, was the Rabbi of Trier until 1804, and Marx’s father officially adopted the surname
Marx following Napoleon’s imperial edict in 1808. Moreover, Marx’s uncle, Samuel Marx, was
Chief Rabbi of Trier after the death of Karl’s grandfather and remained so until his death in 1827;
this uncle lived in the city’s synagogue with his family during his tenure as chief rabbi. Marx
nevertheless grew up in a Protestant milieu and was born directly after a tumult of ever-changing
political systems in the Rhineland. Due to this increasing pressure, Marx’s father publicly
converted to the Lutheran faith around 1818, and he further had all of his children baptized around
1825. Although a seemingly singular family history, the Marx family’s story comprises the wider
movement of German Jews who converted to Christianity to gain entry into professions and social
life of the time. Considering the role of Christendom as a geopolitical concept (i.e. Europe as
political stronghold of Christianity), the practice of nominal conversion was not uncommon among
European Jews. Considering the waves of anti-Semitism characterizing Europe in the 19th century,
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it was also a less desired after-effect that many Jews, including Marx, appropriated a form of
Jewish self-hatred.7
Nevertheless, as Marx expressed his philosophy in systematic, scientific terms, his
philosophy contrasted greatly with the insights in the philosophical writings of his contemporary,
Nietzsche, who was born into a Protestant family in Saxony. Friedrich’s father, Carl Ludwig
Nietzsche, was a Lutheran pastor, and the majority of Nietzsche’s male relatives consisted of
pastors. Although his father died when Friedrich was five years old, there is evidence that he spent
a significant amount of time with his maternal grandfather, a pastor as well. After graduating from
the Schulpforta, Nietzsche commenced studies in theology in 1864 at the University of Bonn.
Thomas H. Brobjer describes the earliest portion of Nietzsche’s life until 1866 as his most religious
phase, in which Nietzsche included evidence of a belief in God in several letters. He asserts that
although Nietzsche later became a vitriolic opponent to Christianity, his early pious devotion to
the Protestant faith is noticeable and surprising in light of his later criticisms of Christianity per
se: “…the almost complete absence of discussion or critique of Christianity for the first ten years
after his rejection of it…coupled with his occasional positive statements about Christianity, clearly
imply that it was not just a question of accommodating to external pleasures. In spite of Nietzsche’s
later claims, the truth is that at this time Nietzsche did not view Christianity as a major
philosophical or cultural problem or opponent.”8 The danger in such analyses of early religious
piety is the tendency to assert modern or religious beliefs onto a historical figure like Nietzsche to
frame him as a “Christian” philosopher in early life, which he certainly was not. This type of
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Thomas H. Brobjer, “Nietzsche’s Changing Relation with Christianity: Nietzsche as Christian, Atheist, and
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exegesis of Nietzsche’s texts may thus lead to an intentional fallacy within criticism. Nevertheless,
Nietzsche remained preoccupied with Christianity all the way up to the publication of Der
Antichrist; Nietzsche’s preoccupation with Christianity did not stem from the reality that
Christianity was the majority contemporary religion of Europe but rather the inner mechanisms of
Christian thought and how Christian dogma affects its adherents psychologically.
However, after 1866, according to Brobjer, Nietzsche was engaged in a life ultimately of
indifference toward religion until around 1874. Writing to his friends Pinder and Krug in 1872,
Nietzsche seems to have solidified his doubts about Christianity enough to put to paper and
provides a foretaste of his later exploration of the psychological effects of Christianity. Nietzsche
writes: “daß Gott Mensch geworden ist, weist nur darauf hin, daß der Mensch nicht im
Unendlichen seine Seligkeit suchen soll, sondern auf der Erde seinen Himmel gründe; der Wahn
einer überirdischen Welt hatte die Menschengeister in eine falsche Stellung zu der irdischen Welt
gebracht: er war das Erzeugniß einer Kindheit der Völker.”9 Despite the manifest disinterest in
religious doctrine, here Nietzsche makes a bold statement about man’s relation to God: not only
does he in some ways parrot Feuerbach’s earlier work on humankind and God, but he also
indirectly engages with the ideas of human deficiency present in Christian dogma, in that he
addresses church doctrines which insist on denying the present life in the hope for the better,
eternal life (an issue Nietzsche takes up later in the Genealogie der Moral). For Nietzsche, the
religious background of Protestantism informed his earliest thought, as he in some ways echoed
the effects of Martin Luther’s reforms on Germany. Luther’s public questioning of Catholic
religious authority signified a substantial break with the centralized authoritarian belief system of
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the Church that condemned all dissent, and this environment of Protestant dissent essentially
provided the basis for Nietzsche to develop an openly skeptical standpoint against Christian
dogma.
In the context of Marxian and Nietzschean arguments against humans as deficient beings,
the Protestant Reformation catalyzed the increasing weakening of ecclesiastical power which led
to the dearth of Protestant religious opinions and denominations still present today in the West,
particularly in the United States.10 Jacob Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish write that Luther’s
“doctrine of justification by faith alone transformed most of the sacramental system into an
unnecessary apparatus and broke the church’s hold on the individual.”11 Addressing the issue of
penance in Catholic tradition, for example, George Anastaplo writes that “it can be said [that]
Luther revived something that had been lost (or muted) in Christianity by the Roman Catholic
Church, the importance of justification by grace.”12 On the geopolitical level, Luther’s doctrine of
sola fide indeed dealt a blow to the power apparatus of the Church and its monopoly on salvation
and European spirituality; because no human deed was sufficient enough for God according to
Luther, the Church’s insistence on the priest as proxy and good works as penance seemed
insignificant to salvation. Luther believed that the priest and ecclesiastical authorities separated
the people from God.
Average German-speaking Christians, after Luther, were able to read the Bible in their own
tongue, directly confess their sins to God, and justify themselves solely by their belief in God.

10
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Many religious and political authorities (practically the same power apparatus at the time)
considered Luther a heretic because he transferred religious power into the hands of the common
believer which led to the redundancy of ecclesiastical authorities. John H. Smith writes on
Nietzsche’s complex view of Luther, stating that Nietzsche believed “that the Italian Renaissance
was leading to a kind of self-cancellation of Christianity since the Catholic church had internalized
the ‘will to power’ of rediscovered Roman antiquity, and that it was Luther’s critique of the papacy
that allowed for a resurgence of religious sentiment and faith.”13 Thus, according to Smith’s
assessment, Nietzsche recognized great moving power in the preaching of Martin Luther beginning
at the start of the 16th century. Even Marx wrote about Luther’s groundbreaking break with papal
authority in his Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: “[Luther] hat den Glauben an die
Autorität gebrochen, weil er die Autorität des Glaubens restaurirt hat. Er hat die Pfaffen in Laien
verwandelt, weil er die Laien in Pfaffen verwandelt hat. Er hat den Menschen von der äussern
Religiosität befreit, weil er die Religiosität zum innern Menschen gemacht hat. Er hat den Leib
von der Kette emancipirt, weil er das Herz in Ketten gelegt.”14 Stathis Kouvelakis writes of Marx’s
understanding of Germany’s religious past: “Marx maintains that Luther and the Reformation set
the stage, theoretically and practically, for the moment of German philosophy, and puts the whole
of this movement under the banner of the revolution. The historical significance of the Reformation
lies in its internalization of the question of faith and religious authority; this was the first step in a
secularizing movement that paved the way for a philosophical critique of religion which traced it
back to its human roots and freed the people from the bonds of servitude.”15 I hold that Luther’s
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efforts not only (perhaps unintentionally) led later European thinkers to defy earthly religious
authorities but that they ultimately paved the way for later German philosophers to challenge the
authority of religion itself as a category of human thought; it was the systematic dismantling of the
power apparatus of the Church which broke down the concept of the “heretical” in the critiques of
politico-religious authorities.

12

III. Friedrich Nietzsche
`

Friedrich Nietzsche devoted so much of his later writings to analyzing the ways in which

Christianity affected its adherents and the collective psyche of the Western world that one may
have considered him pre-occupied with Christianity. He criticized Christianity the most
vehemently in Der Antichrist (1888, rendered in English as both The Antichrist and The AntiChristian). Perhaps recalling Marx’s “Opium des Volkes” claim, he writes: “Was nehmen jetzt
wilde Völkerschaften zuerst von den Europäern an? Branntwein und Christenthum, die
europäischen Narcotica.”16 He ultimately rejected Christianity because of the belief in humans as
deficient beings which must be perpetuated to necessitate the existence of God. Christianity,
according to Nietzsche, was a form of self-imposed self-abnegation which subdued the hidden
“powers” and strengths of human beings. Nietzsche, descending from a family of clergymen, was
familiar with such doctrines, including the essential Christian doctrine of original sin. In addition,
Nietzsche appeared as a cultural critic in Europe at the apex of German theorists who had already
made controversial claims about Christianity which involved the dismantling of the concept of
“God.”
The German theologian of the Tübingen circle, David Friedrich Strauss, for example, had
controversially denied the divinity of Christ in his 1835 text Das Leben Jesu (although he was
certainly not to the first to do so). Later, the materialist philosopher and former student of Hegel,
Ludwig Feuerbach, had posited in his book Das Wesen des Christenthums (1841) that this
“essence” of Christianity (and all theism) was the self-estrangement which occurs when humans
perpetuate the existence and belief in “God,” who is actually the sum of all the positive qualities
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desired by human beings which complement their inadequacies. Brobjer, in analyzing Nietzsche’s
apostasy, points out that Nietzsche wished for Feuerbach’s book for his birthday in 1861 and that
in 1865, Nietzsche also read Strauss’s Das Leben Jesu.17 Feuerbach, opposing his former teacher
Hegel – who stated that man was God in his self-alienation – instead claimed the opposite, that
God is man in his self-alienation. Therefore, religion requires that human beings self-deprecate to
uphold the existence of a deity: humans must create the idea of a perfect God to counter the
reiterated imperfections manifest in Christianity’s view of human nature. The believer’s
relationship to God, Jesus Christ, and the Church all depend upon a self-proclaimed insufficiency
to obtain salvation.
Emerging from this discourse, Nietzsche first publicly described this human necessity to
create God in his pessimistic text on Ancient Greek culture, Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem
Geiste der Musik (1871): “Um leben zu können, mußten die Griechen diese Götter, aus tiefster
Nötigung, schaffen . . . Wie anders hätte jenes so reizbar empfindende, so ungestüm begehrende,
zum Leiden so einzig befähigte Volk das Dasein ertragen können, wenn ihm nicht dasselbe, von
einer höheren Glorie umflossen, in seinen Göttern gezeigt worden wäre.” 18 We already see here
that Nietzsche, although grappling with the reason why the Greeks created gods, nonetheless
acknowledges the power and influence of the religious beliefs which the Greeks created.
According to his controversial pessimistic view of the Greeks, their coping with their existence
produced their capacity to suffer, and the Greeks transposed the inadequacies of human existence
into the concept of gods. Minute traces of Feuerbachian thought can be found here, in that
Nietzsche – by way of his example of the Greeks – essentially states that human beings, and not
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merely the Christians of his day, have a tendency to displace and fracture their human nature by
consolidating their own desired qualities in the qualities of a god: omniscient, omnipresent, allloving, all good (at least in the Christian context).
Nietzsche later confronts these doctrines of deficiency directly in his later work, Zur
Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift (1887). Investigating the origins of Judeo-Christian
morality, Nietzsche describes the ways in which guilt historically has functioned as a form of
control. In traditional Christian doctrine, the Christian believer must thank God for the saving
grace of Jesus Christ – a salvation from deficiencies and dire shortcomings (“sin”), the guilt of
which adherents of Christianity impose on themselves through dogma and self-deprecating speechacts. Nietzsche addresses this self-imposed sin later in Der Antichrist, claiming that Buddhism is
more practical and more reflective of reality than Christianity, in that it describes the struggles of
life as “suffering” rather than as “sin.”19 Stephen Mulhall writes on this self-imposed burden of sin
which Nietzsche describes in Zur Genealogie der Moral: “But when our ultimate father is God,
then our debt becomes crushingly beyond measurement; and when God’s Son gratuitously takes
the burden of that debt upon himself, He only intensifies the burden. The religious narrative of
original sinfulness and its overcoming thus intensifies the sadomasochism of bad conscience to
the point at which human existence appears cursed rather than promising.”20 According to Mulhall,
the relationship of guilt between humans and God only increases the necessity for humans to
reiterate their “inborn” deficiency. On the one hand, the doctrine of original sin inescapably
imposes a guilt on the Christian from birth onward: Christ died for all human beings, and thus all
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humans owe him for the sacrifice, according to the theology. The Christian version of faith thus
presupposes this intrinsic deficiency and need to rely on Jesus Christ’s sacrifice for salvation.
However, according to Nietzsche, such a belief in human deficiency and weakness affect the
psyche of the adherents themselves, even if reliance on God can lead the Christian adherent to
something positive, such as supposed eternal salvation.
One of Nietzsche’s insights in his genealogy, combining historiographic and philological
methods, is the way in which he dissects the Christian version of guilt, which the German language
expresses as Schuld, a word which simultaneously means guilt and debt. I hold this insight to be
the core facet of Nietzsche’s whole criticism of Christianity; one’s relationship to Christ in
Christianity persists on the fact that one needs this relationship. Approaching the issue as a
philologist, he proposes in Zur Genealogie der Moral that Christianity is based on what he
describes as a “creditor-debtor” relationship, and he does not illuminate the relationship between
guilt and debt intrinsic in the German term Schuld as a mere afterthought: for Nietzsche, “guilt” is
debt – an owing something to God. Writing on the historical equivalence of damages/pain (both
translated as Schaden in German), Nietzsche asks: “Woher diese uralte, tiefgewurzelte, vielleicht
jetzt nicht mehr ausrottbare Idee ihre Macht genommen hat, die Idee einer Äquivalenz von
Schaden und Schmerz? Ich habe es bereits verraten: in dem Vertragsverhältnis zwischen
Gläubiger und Schuldner, das so alt ist, als es überhaupt ‘Rechtssubjekte’ gibt, und seinerseits
wieder auf die Grundformen von Kauf, Verkauf, Tausch, Handel und Wandel zurückweist.”21
Analyzing the Christian’s relationship to God philologically, Nietzsche hints at the nature of this
relationship to God as originally being expressed in economic rather than metaphysical terms. He
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depicts religion as a contract (Vertragsverhältnis), but it is not necessarily a contract on which any
human being agrees from birth. Thus the Christian tradition, for Nietzsche, is based on the
hereditary debt to God. He writes further:
Das Bewußtsein, Schulden gegen die Gottheit zu haben, ist, wie die Geschichte lehrt, auch
nach dem Niedergang der blutverwandtschaftlichen Organisationsform der ‘Gemeinschaft’
keineswegs zum Abschluß gekommen; die Menschheit hat, in gleicher Weise, wie sie die
Begriffe ‚gut und schlecht‘ von dem Geschlechts-Adel...geerbt hat, mit der Erbschaft der
Geschlechts- und Stammgottheiten auch die des Drucks von noch unbezahlten Schulden
und des Verlangens nach Ablösung derselben hinzubekommen. . . Das Schuldgefühl gegen
die Gottheit hat mehrere Jahrtausende nicht aufgehört zu wachsen, und zwar immerfort im
gleichen Verhältnisse, wie der Gottesbegriff und das Gottesgefühl auf Erden gewachsen
und in die Höhe getragen worden ist. . . Die Heraufkunft des christlichen Gottes, als des
Maximal-Gottes, der bisher erreicht worden ist, hat deshalb auch das Maximum des
Schuldgefühls auf Erden zur Erscheinung gebracht.22
He thus characterizes the Christian God as the height of the feeling of Schuld in human history, as
he represents the “ultimate god” (Maximal-Gott). Nietzsche here equates the feeling of “guilt”
developing with the idea of God, both developing in history concurrently. The word Gottesbegriff
indicates Nietzsche’s deep cynicism about God as being and again reiterates Feuerbach’s
irrevocable early influence on Nietzsche. Nietzsche seems to depict Christianity as the religion
characteristic in the way in which it imposes “innate” guilt on human beings – human beings are
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born with original sin, and this original sin presupposes the entire idea of Christianity. Earthly life
in the Christian worldview indicates automatic debt owed to God.
Nietzsche here in the Genealogie der Moral rejects the idea of human deficiency on which
Christianity thrives.23 It had, according to Nietzsche, negatively shaped the cultures it influenced
by denying its adherents the full embracing of their “powers” which were for so long bound up in
the concept of God. Christianity functions as a target of Nietzsche’s critique not only because it
shaped his own spiritual development, but also largely because of its necessary relationship of
guilty party to Jesus Christ as a prerequisite to salvation. Such indebtedness to a deity splinters the
human’s nature and detaches the inner spirituality from the physical body and displaces it.
Christianity has even more dire effects on the psyche of human beings, an indebtedness which
creditors originally expressed in the form of physical punishment, according to Nietzsche. 24 He
explains that the primeval relationship between creditor and debtor allowed violence to occur to
ensure that the debtor paid: “Namentlich aber konnte der Gläubiger dem Leibe des Schuldners alle
Arten Schmach und Folter antun, zum Beispiel so viel davon herunterschneiden, als der Größe der
Schuld angemessen schien.”25 This historical example presented by Nietzsche reinforces what
Stephen Mulhall describes as the “sadomasochism of bad conscience” of Christ’s relation to
human beings. Nietzsche even attributes this primeval form of payment as the basis for the terms
of Christianity: “In dieser Sphäre, im Obligationen-Rechte also, hat die moralische Begriffswelt
‘Schuld’, ‘Gewissen’, ‘Pflicht’, ‘Heiligkeit der Pflicht’ ihren Entstehungsherd – ihr Anfang ist,
wie der Anfang alles Großen auf Erden, gründlich und lange mit Blut begossen worden.”26 Bernard
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Reginster has interpreted Nietzsche’s account of Christian guilt as an expression of the perversion
of normal guilt – that according to Nietzsche, “the Christian representation of guilt is not an
account of the ordinary feeing of guilt…but a perversion of it, which results from its exploitation
as an instrument of self-directed cruelty.”27
Considering such antipathy toward Christianity, it seems unlikely that Nietzsche would
have been able to build a new religious feeling or religious idea into his philosophy of the future.
I hold that Nietzsche’s philosophy contains fundamentally metaphysical – perhaps not yet fully
religious – elements in its affirming answer to nihilism, which features Nietzsche’s vision of a
post-Christian future and the development of the Übermensch. On the one hand, it is thoroughly
reductionist to limit Nietzsche solely to arguments against all religion, as Nietzsche in some
passages even lauds its effects. In Jenseits von Gut und Böse (1886), for example, Nietzsche writes:
“Für die Starken, Unabhängigen, zum Befehlen Vorbereiteten und Vorbestimmten, in denen die
Vernunft und Kunst einer regierenden Rasse leibhaft wird, ist Religion ein Mittel mehr, um
Widerstände zu überwinden, um herrschen zu können.”28 Of course, this view of religion fit into
Nietzsche’s aristocratic, almost Darwinian view of human life (especially as he had already stated
that life is the will to power29). Nietzsche goes on to write:
Asketismus und Puritanismus sind fast unentbehrliche Erziehungs- und Veredelungsmittel,
wenn eine Rasse über ihre Herkunft aus dem Pöbel Herr werden will und sich zur
einstmaligen Herrschaft emporarbeitet. Den gewöhnlichen Menschen endlich, den
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Allermeisten, welche zum Dienen und zum allgemeinen Nutzen dasind und nur insofern
dasein dürfen, giebt die Religion eine unschätzbare Genügsamkeit mit ihrer Lage und Art,
vielfachen Frieden des Herzens, eine Veredlung des Gehorsams, ein Glück und Leid mehr
mit Ihres-Gleichen und Etwas von Verklärung und Verschönerung, Etwas von
Rechtfertigung des ganzen Alltags, der ganzen Niedrigkeit, der ganzen Halbthier-Armuth
ihrer Seele. Religion und religiöse Bedeutsamkeit des Lebens legt Sonnenglanz auf solche
immer geplagte Menschen und macht ihnen selbst den eigenen Anblick erträglich. . .
Vielleicht ist am Christenthum und Buddhismus nichts so ehrwürdig als ihre Kunst, noch
den Niedrigsten anzulehren, sich durch Frömmigkeit in eine höhere Schein-Ordnung der
Dinge zu stellen und damit das Genügen an der wirklichen Ordnung, innerhalb deren sie
hart genug leben, – und gerade diese Härte thut Noth! – bei sich festzuhalten.30
Although Nietzsche here retains a somewhat supercilious tone concerning religious adherents, he
nonetheless praises religion for providing the common people meaning for their everyday lives.
This view of religion, however, is not religion proper, but rather a somewhat self-serving view of
religion which eliminates the purpose of worshiping a god. Although asceticism and Puritanism
may bring a certain “race” out of the depths of the rabble, each system of thought causes its
adherents to deny their bodies and the Earth as any sources of meaning. It is primarily by negating
the Earth and the body and projecting all energies onto an otherworldly realm – an “afterlife” –
that ascetics find meaning.
Although ascetics are typically associated with a specific religious tradition, Nietzsche
rejects all asceticism as another form of splintering human nature. Nietzsche identified the problem
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of modern human self-perception as human beings displacing life, and the latent religious aspects
of Nietzsche’s philosophy may be found in the spiritual void he describes in several of his works.
The fledgling form of this void appears as early as Die Geburt der Tragödie, in which he asserts
that a Greek tragic culture must replace the void of spirituality created by the human quest for
knowledge through science. Arguably the most famous iteration of this idea is Nietzsche’s God is
dead assertion. Nietzsche writes in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft in the aphorism entitled “Neue
Kämpfe”: “Nachdem Buddha todt war, zeigte man noch Jahrhunderte lang seinen Schatten in einer
Höhle, — einen ungeheuren schauerlichen Schatten. Gott ist todt: aber so wie die Art der
Menschen ist, wird es vielleicht noch Jahrtausende lang Höhlen geben, in denen man seinen
Schatten zeigt. — Und wir — wir müssen auch noch seinen Schatten besiegen!”31
He then writes: “Gott ist todt! Gott bleibt todt! Und wir haben ihn getödtet! Wie trösten
wir uns, die Mörder aller Mörder? Das Heiligste und Mächtigste, was die Welt bisher besass, es
ist unter unseren Messern verblutet, — wer wischt diess Blut von uns ab? Mit welchem Wasser
könnten wir uns reinigen? Welche Sühnfeiern, welche heiligen Spiele werden wir erfinden
müssen? Ist nicht die Grösse dieser That zu gross für uns? Müssen wir nicht selber zu Göttern
werden, um nur ihrer würdig zu erscheinen?”32 Although Nietzsche’s claim appears to be
controversial, he asserts that God is no longer a reliable source of meaning or value for human
beings, but that the effects of God may last for centuries after his death. Numerous pop versions
of Nietzsche’s claim abound which erroneously perpetuate the idea that “God is dead” must be
understood to mean “God does not exist and never did exist.” A recent popular example is Harold
Cronk’s 2014 Christian drama God’s Not Dead – the title a play on Nietzsche’s infamous
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announcement33 – perpetuates the idea that Nietzsche was solely a villainous atheist, as it depicts
a philosophy professor – an atheist – who challenges a college student’s Christian faith. The depoliticized Nietzsche, however, was grappling with the void of godlessness in Western culture and
the spiritual void it would leave once this void left human beings on their own to create values for
themselves.
Nietzsche’s belief that human beings must fill the void and escape the shadow left by God
is a belief colored by the supersensual idea of a type of ontology, that is, a way in which humans
explain and justify their existence. This new Nietzschean “ontology,” however, fills the void left
by God in an anti-egalitarian way, although “ontology” may be too strong and systematic of a term
to apply to how Nietzsche perceived his philosophical task. I believe that Nietzsche’s view of new
“religions,” if it owes anything to Luther and the Reformation, relies on the gradual dismantling
of traditional unified and exclusive versions of religious doctrine, which the Catholic Church
exhibited in Luther’s Germany and which in Nietzsche’s life manifested itself most physically in
the later Christian-based works of Richard Wagner.34 Didier Franck states that “the death of God
is henceforth the impossibility of a new god; it is the now finished past of any god to come, and to
think, as Heidegger did, that only ‘one’ god could save us now is, at the very least, as much to
misunderstand the meaning of God as it is that of his death.”35 I disagree with Franck in the sense
that one may interpret the death of God as “the impossibility of a new god,” as theorists such as
Steven Aschheim, in his essay “After the Death of God: Varieties of Nietzschean Religion,” have
examined the tendency post-Nietzsche to glorify his philosophical texts into religion. Franck
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fittingly asserts that “the death of the Christian god [according to Nietzsche] means the collapse
of our world, which for two millennia never ceased revolving around him.”36 Lawrence J. Hatab
writes: “The Christian God – conceived as a unified, eternal, rational, benevolent creator –
represented the metaphysical foundation of a stable origin and guarantee of truth that it had
operated in all areas of Western intellectual culture, in morality, politics, philosophy, even science
(consider philosophers such as Descartes, Bacon, Leibniz, Locke, Kant, and Hegel).” 37 Humans
must thus develop in the wake of God’s death to derive their own individual meaning out of life,
which is a Nietzschean “doctrine” commonly referred to as life affirmation. Such life affirmation,
however, need not be religious – in the sense of a collective movement – but it nonetheless suggests
a meaning-seeking process taken on by those who strive for the Übermensch.
Franck points out how Martin Heidegger interpreted Nietzsche’s statement that God is
dead: “As an ontology, even Nietzsche’s metaphysics is at the same time theology. . . Such
metaphysical theology is of course a negative theology of a peculiar kind. Its negativity is revealed
in the expression ‘God is dead.’ That is an expression not of atheism but of onto-theo-logy, in that
metaphysics in which nihilism proper is fulfilled.”38 Heidegger therefore interprets Nietzsche’s
assertion of the death of God as the fulfillment of nihilism, and for Heidegger nihilism cannot be
represented as a form of atheistic expression. Although Nietzsche’s writings present a somewhat
complicated relationship to nihilism, Nietzsche ultimately considers a nihilistic outlook as
particularly disastrous for human beings. Nietzsche expressed this in its earliest form in defending
the Dionysian aspect of human life in Die Geburt der Tragödie, describing how the Apollonian
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drive had led humanity too far in the direction of scientific inquiry and devalued art as the way to
interpret the world as an aesthetic phenomenon. Nietzsche’s philosophy of the future hinges
largely upon the previous place filled that Christianity occupied in the European psyche, as this is
later reflected in the death of God; Nietzsche expresses this philosophy of the future only in postChristian terms, and such hinging on Christianity echoes Paul Tillich’s assertion of the spiritual
place it has held in the Western spiritual and religious thought.
Here the somewhat complicated difference between atheism and nihilism must be noted. It
is a reductionist argument to assert that atheism can be equated with nihilism, in that they both
involve rejecting popular human sources of meaning within a specific cultural context, and
Nietzsche primarily grappled with nihilism, the complete rejection of any meaning to human life.
Considering that Nietzsche in the end places himself and his vision of the future against existential
nihilism, it is unlikely that Nietzsche’s version of atheism is completely devoid of any residual
metaphysical elements, although such elements may not at all be religious in content or style. In
other words, the atheism Nietzsche expounds in his texts is not nihilistic; that is, it does not assert
that life is without meaning. Again, I hold this rejection of nihilism as a fundamentally
metaphysically driven feeling, because it requires that human beings assign meaning to life
through a particular narrative, and Nietzsche establishes this narrative through the Übermensch. In
my opinion, the primarily religious framework within Nietzsche worked consisted of the eventual
transferring of the religious, metaphysical, and heavenly down to the realm of human beings –
echoed by the beginning of his Zarathustra, as Zarathustra descends to the people – since,
according to Nietzsche and many of his predecessors, religion is the displacing of the human spirit
or “alienation.” Nietzsche’s primarily “religious” task was to re-consolidate the metaphysical
capabilities of human contemplation and the Western psyche.
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It was possible, however, for Nietzsche to construct a kind of pseudo-religious outlook
which also asserted the sufficiency of human beings. A particularly stylistically “religious” text
written by Nietzsche was arguably his Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für alle und keinen
(1883). The manifest quality of Nietzsche’s writing rests partially upon a Christian rhetorical
tradition: Nietzsche fashioned the text in the language of Luther’s translation of the Christian
Bible, and Nietzsche intentionally published his work in verses to match such a biblical style. One
may also view this as Nietzsche constructing a sarcastic homage to the power inherent in the
rhetoric of the Christian New Testament and the style of the written sermons of Jesus Christ. In
Zarathustra’s prologue, Zarathustra sets the tone for his mission among the human beings to whom
he is descending the mountain to “preach” (ironically, considering that his first encounter on the
mountainside results in Zarathustra’s shock than an elderly religious man has not yet realized that
God is dead39). Zarathustra states in his last spoken verse in the first chapter of the prologue:
“Siehe! Dieser Becher will wieder leer werden, und Zarathustra will wieder Mensch werden.”40
This “wieder Mensch werden” is curious in the context of alienation, in that Zarathustra, a
“religious” mystic, must reconnect with his human nature in order to teach humanity below him;
he must “go down” or “set” (untergehen) just as the sun does at the end of each day.
Zarathustra, descending from his mountain as anti-preacher, describes humans as a bridge:
“Was gross ist am Menschen, das ist, dass er eine Brücke und kein Zweck ist: was geliebt werden
kann am Menschen, das ist, dass er ein Uebergang und ein Untergang ist [emphasis in original].”41
Nietzsche – or rather, Zarathustra – takes the Darwinian evolutionary rhetoric of the 19th century
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and creates thereby a heightened form of spiritual rhetoric. Such a rhetoric of ascending from low
to high as a natural process appears concretely as Zarathustra transitions from the heights of the
mountains to the people below to spread his message of the Übermensch. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra takes on a particularly pessimistic perspective of the prevailing contemporary view
(Zarathustra’s contemporaries) of human nature. The underlying Nietzschean idea of the
affirmation of life props up Zarathustra as he criticizes the opponents of life in his speech “Von
den Predigern des Todes.” Zarathustra here disparages the way in which the “preachers of death”
displace the spiritual powers of humans, almost viewing life as somewhat of a gift to be cherished
by those living it. Zarathustra’s residual tone is, in my opinion, optimistic, although the language
he employs simultaneously suggests a deep cynicism. His tone is optimistic in that he recognizes
the underlying value of those to whom he speaks and takes a stance against what can only be
deemed a suicidal outlook on life: the greatest problem Zarathustra finds in the preachers of death
is their insistence on disparaging human life.
Zarathustra describes these preachers of death in the following way: “Sie sind noch nicht
einmal Menschen geworden, diese Fürchterlichen: mögen sie Abkehr predigen vom Leben und
selber dahinfahren! / Da sind die Schwindsüchtigen der Seele: kaum sind sie geboren, so fangen
sie schon an zu sterben und sehnen sich nach Lehren der Müdigkeit und Entsagung.” 42 The view
of humans as naturally deficient latently informs in these preachers’ doctrines. Zarathustra slyly
never directly engages with one religious tradition (perhaps to retain the mythical tone of the text),
only mentioning Jesus of Nazareth once – calling him “der Hebräer Jesus.”43 One may view
Zarathustra’s endorsement of the affirmation of life as Nietzsche’s literary response to Western
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doctrines of deficiency. The Christian doctrine of original sin, for example, emphasizes above all
the birth of a human being as the beginning of a sin – a debt – to God. Birth as simultaneously the
beginning of life and the beginning of sin thus present a paradox to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: The
preaching of death – this inherently suicidal purpose of life – casts human life in the ultimate
pessimistic light, and death as a goal displaces those opportunities to discover meaning in life.
Zarathustra pronounces the goal of these preachers as Abkehr (“renunciation,” “turning away”),
and in doing this, he touches on the feelings of resignation to life in the preachers’ doctrine of
“Abkehr vom Leben,” but also announces their ironic death due to the very same destructive
perspective on life.
Nietzsche describes the doctrine of the denial of life – which is essential to the framework
of the existing world religions – as “Abkehr vom Leben,” a foretaste of the way in which he later
criticizes asceticism in his Genealogie der Moral. Reginster characterizes Nietzsche’s view on this
“withdrawal” from life and ascetic outlook which Zarathustra addresses: “Just as cruelty was
seeking the suffering of others not as a means but an end in itself, asceticism is seeking one’s own
suffering not as means but as an end in itself. There is nothing paradoxical in depriving oneself of
something as a means to get to something else; but there is something ‘paradoxical to the highest
degree’ in depriving oneself for the sake of deprivation.”44 Nietzsche later states that the driving
force behind asceticism is due to the fact that ascetics actually recognize a great force within
themselves which they must overcome: their will to power drives their asceticism, but to no
discernible end. Paul S. Loeb draws a connection between Zarathustra’s speech on the preachers
of death and the earlier speech entitled “Von den Taranteln”: “Thus, according to Zarathustra, it is
because the will feels impotent against time and the past that it aims to increase its feeling of power
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by making others suffer as it does. In particular, Zarathustra says, the will takes revenge upon all
that can suffer. . . In this way, Zarathustra reiterates the psychological lesson of his earlier
‘Tarantulas’ speech – namely, that what is impotent secretly plots revenge against everything that
has power.”45
Conway has also explored a second notable homage-parody in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra,
that of a Socratic dialogue – most particularly, Plato’s Republic. Conway not only draws
comparisons between Plato’s Socrates in The Republic and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra but also points
out Nietzsche’s characterization of Socratic morality as “improvement-morality” [BesserungsMoral].46 In this improvement-morality there is an intrinsic hierarchy of the speaker (in
Nietzsche’s case, Zarathusta) above the “auditors.” Conway compares Zarathustra’s descent to the
people to the katabasis of the Socratic philosopher: in both cases the speakers intend to raise those
listening to a higher morality. Conway writes: “According to Nietzsche, the absurdum practicum
of the Socratic katabasis is actually endemic to the Socratic moral tradition as a whole, which,
because it presupposes the deficiency of human nature, he calls the improvement-morality.”47
Although Christianity may seem to fit the criteria of such a morality, Nietzsche’s thoughts in the
Genealogie der Moral would later prove otherwise, due to the figure of the ascetic priest. The
ascetic priest, to reproduce the hierarchy of speaker and auditor, necessarily perpetuates the
perceived deficiency of his followers.
He later writes that “Socrates’ campaign to improve mankind failed, as must all
incarnations of the improvement-morality, because his commitment to the inherent deficiency of
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human nature is incompatible with any genuine enhancement of mankind’s political situation.”48
Conway here touches upon a method of address inherently Nietzschean, which again shows the
aristocratic hue of Nietzsche’s thought. In Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, he discovers the frustration and
the dilemma of the Socratic philosopher. He writes that “although Zarathustra officially promotes
the sufficiency of his auditors, he does so in such a way that implies their deficiency. Hence,
whereas Zarathustra’s discourse ostensibly challenges the Socratic improvement-morality, his
actual practices in the world reinforce it instead.”49 Conway points out a great irony in Zarathustra
– one that plagues the “elevated” Socratic philosophers who assert human sufficiency against
doctrines of deficiency. He points out that Nietzsche is able to “enlist Zarathustra as both
protagonist and foil.”50 This is partially the lot of Nietzsche himself as philosopher in asserting
human sufficiency. Although attempting to moralize his “auditors,” Nietzsche does not sway from
his aristocratic view of the attainment of a higher morality and higher moral purpose. In other
words, the Socratic philosopher must convince his auditors of what exists outside the “cave” in
order to help them out of the cave; in this form of address, the philosopher must recognize the
auditor’s deficiency. “Socrates’ philosophers are consequently obliged to inhabit the cave, despite
their official contention that the cave represents a deficient way of life.”51 Nevertheless, there is a
significant break with moralizing philosophers and those writing in the field of ethics preceding
Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the form of address to his readers does not presuppose that the speaker
considers his auditors to possess a deficient human nature. Nietzsche as speaker instead addresses
the real, historical institutions which have solidified and internalized the doctrines of human
deficiency in the West, in particular Christianity. According to Zarathustra, it is in the “preachers
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of death” where his auditors take refuge, in that they continue to displace themselves in the
experience of death, which the “preachers of death” reiterate as the purpose of life. I hold that there
is less irony in the fact that Nietzsche considers the power of such religious institutions (such as
Christianity) to have a stranglehold on the psyche of human beings.
Moving from the biblical and Socratic tones which Nietzsche possessed and employed in
his framing of Zarathustra, the way in which Nietzsche’s interpreters reacted to his philosophy
sheds much light on the uses of a religious framework which perhaps left somewhat free rein. The
Christian theologians in Germany after Nietzsche’s death were primarily Protestants, and as Steven
Aschheim mentions, the fact that Protestants attempted to incorporate Nietzsche into their
theologies owes much to the Reformation and what it was by definition: all Protestant
denominations essentially break from the Catholic Church by absorbing external intellectual and
religious elements to form an ultimately decentralized body of religious knowledge. Aschheim
notes how the German writer Ernst Bertram described Nietzsche as “the last and quintessential
expression of Protestantism.”52 Aschheim writes further that “Protestantism, itself the product of
a break with a powerful normative tradition, had always been especially receptive to external,
modern influences.”53 Historically, the distinguishing feature of all “protests” in the Protestant
sense was the dismantling of a religious apparatus. However, here Aschheim points out how
particular Protestant theologians wished to absorb and incorporate Nietzschean elements into
traditional German Protestantism, rather than to dismantle Protestantism itself.54
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A gendered approach to the attempt to incorporate Nietzsche’s philosophy into Protestant
Christianity echoed in the move from what was deemed an “effeminate” to a more “masculine”
Christianity, which only the ideas of Nietzsche could foster. Among the theologians Aschheim
mentions, the German theologian Hans Gallwitz attempted, above all, to reframe Christianity and
“rediscover” the original Christianity, which was based on a morality which predated the slave
revolt in morality (to use Nietzsche’s terminology). Ironically, Aschheim also mentions how the
Catholic Church interpreted the Protestant appropriation of Nietzsche as a sign of weakness within
the German Protestant church, mainly due to the Protestants’ lack of centralized religious
authority.55 Aschheim also ascribes the rising nationalism in Europe to the need to express
Christianity in Nietzschean terms of warrior values and the Übermensch. Within the context of
doctrines which reiterate the supposed deficiency of human beings by birth, Aschheim’s article
has an undertone which suggests that several German theologians subtly exploited the philosophy
of Nietzsche. The characteristic feature of this appropriation by Protestants fits into a complicated
portion of European history – the turn of the century, when European nationalism was not only a
growing phenomenon before the First World War, but also served as a tool for opportunists to gain
mass support for religious and political movements. In many ways, several Protestant churches
utilized the image of Friedrich Nietzsche to conform their doctrines into a relatively esteemed view
of human beings as opposed to how traditional Christian doctrines consider humans – inadequate
and sinful.
A revealing commentator of early 20th century on Nietzsche in the context of human
sufficiency arguments, as Aschheim describes, was Paul Schulze-Berghof. Working within a field
of German mysticism, Schulze-Berghof grouped Nietzsche as “mystic” with previous German
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mystics including Meister Eckhart and Jakob Böhme. Aschheim describes how Schulze-Berghof
considered Meister Eckhart to have “located divine creativity in humanity,”56 which suggests a
rather religious characteristic of human nature in the view of Eckhart. The idea of “divine
creativity” fit in well with the clean philosophical slate which Nietzsche’s texts suggested after
criticizing Christianity as an institution. This “action” to create and have an effect against nihilistic
worldviews, although individualistic and aristocratic for Nietzsche, was necessarily for human
beings following Nietzsche’s legacy to interpret the world outside of a Christian outlook and,
ultimately, to affirm their sufficiency. Aschheim writes: “German Christian mysticism, SchulzeBerghof wrote, unlike biblical religion, recognized that human powers constituted the basis of
redemption.”57 Human powers must lead to “redemption” – a religious concept which Nietzsche
perhaps would have expressed in terms of debt and exchange. Aschheim also writes: “Nietzsche
had to be understood as the apotheosis of this tradition. His ideal of the Übermensch was an
expression of this emphasis on the godly humanity.”58 Here the theme of consolidating the
otherworldly with the worldly comes into play – the reconciliation of the estranged nature of
humans with the bodies of the humans themselves.
Considering Nietzsche’s vehemence toward the religions of his day (especially
Christianity), it is nevertheless possible to build a Nietzschean religion which still retains a
religious framework and simultaneously works again the doctrines of deficiency purported by the
world’s major religions. Aschheim points out many of the self-serving theologians and social
activists who utilized Nietzsche’s ideas for political gain on all points of the political spectrum. As
with the theory of religious alienation, Nietzsche desired that future humans would reconnect the
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splintered self with the body and that the “preachers of death” would be eradicated to leave room
for those who would affirm life. Nevertheless, Nietzsche never advocated any one faith or path to
a new type of redemption, although the message inherent in his philosophical works left a legacy
that Protestant theologians interpreted and molded into a 20th-century type of self-affirmation.
Nietzsche’s insights, particularly the way he describes religious sin as “debt,” present religion in
purely economic, pre-Christian terms. If there be any limitation to the creation of a Nietzschean
religion, it is that the earliest interpreters of Nietzsche in the early 20th century were caught up on
the religious atmosphere and language used by Nietzsche, although there existed no set guidelines
– outside the Übermensch – to take humanity higher than face value.
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IV. Karl Marx
The later Marx writing Das Kapital approached the issue of doctrines of human deficiency
by describing the ways in which the idea of alienation (Entfremdung) plays a role in human
relationships under capitalism, describing how the conditions of 19th-century capitalism
transformed the laborer into the cog of a machine. Although primarily known for analyzing and
criticizing the dehumanizing mechanisms of capitalism, Marx’s later theory of alienation owed its
philosophical basis to the preconditions in which the younger Marx developed, particularly
revolving around the intellectual circle between Berlin and Tübingen. Feuerbach’s theory of
religious alienation provided the framework by which Marx developed his own theory, and he
followed – and ultimately commented on – the German debate on and investigation into the nature
of God. Although living outside of the German-speaking lands for over half of his life, Marx’s
theories irrevocably exhibit the influences of the German philosophical milieu in which he
developed as a student. Contrary to Nietzsche, Marx engaged with religion per se and not
specifically Christianity, whereas Nietzsche displayed specific affinities for aspects of Christianity
and, specifically in Der Antichrist, Buddhism. Marx and his contemporaries considered the critique
of religion as the key to discovering all existing forms of alienation in human society. Marx states
quite straightforwardly in the Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: “Die Kritik der Religion
ist die Voraussetzung aller Kritik.”59
By the time Nietzsche had published Die Geburt der Tragödie in 1871, Marx had already
been living for over twenty years as a revolutionary socialist and writer in exile in London. The
young Marx had transferred his studies from Bonn to the University of Berlin, where Hegel’s
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philosophical theories and the whole of German Idealism cast a shadow over the university’s
intellectual environment. In the wake of Hegel’s presence at the university, the young Marx
became involved with the group known as the Young or “Left” Hegelians, who adhered to the
views of Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer, both former students of Hegel. The Young Hegelians,
although taking on Hegel’s name, took primarily a radically Leftist view of his dialectical method,
as they perceived his political attitudes toward the contemporary Prussian state as too conservative.
The young Marx found Feuerbach to be a profound influence through his theory of alienation
presented in Das Wesen des Christenthums, through which Marx appropriated said theory and
applied it to his early sociological thought on religion.
Perhaps the seminal English text on the environment of religious criticism in Germany is
Robert Tucker’s Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (1961). Tucker traces the influence on Marx
to the way in which Hegel analyzed the relationship between humans and God and argues how
Hegel’s Idealist outlook provided the framework for the philosophy of the Young Hegelians and,
eventually, for the Marxist hybrid model of history, dialectical materialism. It is vital to examine
the development of the religious overtones in Marx through Tucker’s characterization of the
Young Hegelian goal of humans to realize themselves as “godlike” beings to properly assess the
basis on which Marxist pseudo-religious ideas were constructed. This form of pseudo-religious
rhetoric does not, on the concrete level, eliminate the words “God” or “godlike” from the rhetoric,
and on the abstract level, does not deny the power of such a concept in rhetorical representations
of the Young Hegelians’ views. Whether intentional or not, the majority of the German rhetoric
on religion at the time existed in relation to the Christian framework out of which it originated,
whether for this framework, borrowing from it, or against it. Tucker describes the varying
contemporary German viewpoints on human beings’ relationship to God and how such viewpoints
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radically changed the Young Hegelians’ view of human nature. Because Hegel described human
beings as God alienated, Tucker argues that the agenda of the Young Hegelians was – as precursors
to Marx’s own method – to invert Hegel’s theory and suggest instead that God expresses the selfalienation of human beings.60 Tucker writes: “The movement of thought from Kant to Hegel
revolved in a fundamental sense around the idea of man’s self-realization as a godlike being or,
alternatively, as God. . . It is hardly surprising that out of such a revolution of religion there issued,
among other things, a religion of revolution.”61 The idea of “God,” which was at this point no
longer a Christian deity in the eyes of the Young Hegelians, had never left their philosophical
framework; it had merely taken an alternative form. Although Bauer and Feuerbach were professed
atheists, they nonetheless held to the category of God and that it fully embodies human alienation.
This “being godlike,” however, did not reflect the way in which the Young Hegelians could
follow a particular Christian doctrine but rather how human beings would be able to recombine
their splintered nature. Thornhill writes that Hegel’s philosophy of religion and its connection with
human freedom “gave a foundation on which the Young Hegelians were able to construe religious
concepts as moments in a course of human formation and self-liberation, to convert religious
narratives into signifiers of reason’s own freedom and, most importantly, to divert religious and
political thinking away from monadically substantial or pure-metaphysical accounts of truth as
divine essence or personality.”62 By converting religious narratives into plausible paths to human
freedom (menschliche Emanzipation), the Young Hegelians did not omit the category of the
“religious” altogether but utilized its inherently emotional power in their rhetoric. Rolf Hosfeld
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writes that “Marx would never escape from the influence exerted by this intellectual concept of an
inverted theology. For him, capital in the modern economic process would remain a general, selfcreated demiurge that confronts and rules over the person as an alien force. It was a grandiose
vision of a world without gods, in which the person was the true source of every society, all
politics, the world of ideas, and history.”63 The “inverted” theology nevertheless remains a
theology, a way in which human beings could realize themselves in the future, and, ultimately, act
as their own gods; therefore, Marx’s vision was necessarily a “world without gods,” since the
young Marx and the Young Hegelians did not reject the power of the god-concept. Their vision
simply provided that the qualities of the gods be transferred back to their source – humans. In
retrospect, Marx and the Young Hegelians acknowledged Hegel’s vision of God as the tool of
humans’ self-realization and inverted the relationship to place human beings at the center of
historical processes. The rhetoric of “being godlike” as described by Tucker, played a vital role in
the “selling” of Young Hegelian ideas which criticized religion per se.
The concept of combining the displaced elements of human nature with the physical,
material lives of human beings takes a manifest form in the works of Marx. One may visualize
such a transfer in terms of “pulling” or “dragging down” the religious elements of humans to the
Earth.64 Marx writes in his Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: “Es ist zunächst die Aufgabe
der Philosophie, die im Dienste der Geschichte steht, nachdem die Heiligengestalt der
menschlichen Selbstentfremdung entlarvt ist, die Selbstentfremdung in ihren unheiligen
Gestalten zu entlarven. Die Kritik des Himmels verwandelt sich damit in die Kritik der Erde,
die Kritik der Religion in die Kritik des Rechts, die Kritik der Theologie in die Kritik der Politik
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[emphasis in original].”65 In the same year (1843), Marx wrote the following words in his formal
response to Bruno Bauer, Zur Judenfrage: “Wir verwandeln nicht die weltlichen Fragen in
theologische. Wir verwandeln die theologischen Fragen in weltliche. Nachdem die Geschichte
lange genug in Aberglauben aufgelöst worden ist, lösen wir den Aberglauben in Geschichte auf.”66
Again, the idea of being godlike reappears in Marx’s assertion that superstition becomes
history, in contrast to its inverted historical example. Marx, in contrast to the more static
metaphysical interpretations of preceding philosophers, viewed the intellectual task of his day with
a hue of social justice: the task of philosophy ought to serve humans by encouraging the criticism
of earthly categories. He continues this rhetoric: “Selbst historisch hat die theoretische
Emanzipation

eine

spezifisch

praktische

Bedeutung

für

Deutschland.

Deutschlands

revolutionäre Vergangenheit ist nämlich theoretisch, es ist die Reformation. Wie damals
der Mönch, so ist es jetzt der Philosoph, in dessen Hirn die Revolution beginnt [emphasis in
original].”67 Inherent in this statement is Marx’s belief that the philosopher as the new “monk” –
the new Luther – must begin a revolution in order to assert the sufficiency of human beings.
Whether or not cynically stated by Marx in his criticism of Hegel, the former schema of displaced
human nature – heaven, religion, theology – was now left for philosophers to interpret in terms
closer to the realm of true human activity – earth, law, politics. In any case, Marx as theorist and
heir of the Young Hegelians never altogether eliminates or ignores the “religious” and the history
of its discourse as a tool for his own further discourse.
Although Marx was an unwavering materialist and ultimately took a scientific approach to
the study of society, there is a latent metaphysical content in Marx’s own brand of the theory of
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alienation and in the ethical solution to such alienation, as he views the reconstituted
Gattungswesen only as a step on the path of human self-realization. By asserting the devalued
Gattungswesen, Marx’s philosophical outlook presupposes some sort of change – social, material,
or both. The “metaphysical” dimension of Marx’s theory is contained in the move from the “is” to
the “ought to be,” and in this “ought to be” lies the intent of changing the way human beings view
themselves beginning in capitalism. Following this intent logically, the tone of Marxist rhetoric
throughout the 19th century (and still today) is driven by the underlying task to redeem those most
disadvantaged by the economic conditions in which they live. The idea of Gattungswesen
(translated both as “species-being” and “species-essence”) implies not only a scientific aspect of
Marx’s thinking on human nature but also an assumption of human nature per se: it assumes a
collective, communal nature of human beings, as opposed to the image of the individual, “selfmade man” in societies characterized by capitalism. In any case, the Gattungswesen according to
Marx has a collective quality not present in Feuerbach. Marx writes in his Thesen über Feuerbach:
“Feuerbach löst das religiöse Wesen in das menschliche Wesen auf. Aber das menschliche Wesen
ist kein, dem einzelnen Individuum innewohnendes Abstraktum. In seiner Wirklichkeit ist es das
Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse.”68 Marx corrects Feuerbach’s theory in his Theses
pre-dating Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory and insists on a social (gesellschaftlich –
characterized by society) human nature. The word Gattung is also curiously biological, although
in this thesis, Marx essentially breaks with any Enlightenment theory of individual agency or
natural state of freedom. The belief that human beings should embrace their Gattungswesen
suggests a unifying, collective type of human nature, not a nature limited to each individual.
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Marx elaborates a critique of the idea of human deficiency in his 1843 response to the
Jewish question by analyzing how the Enlightenment-influenced movement of history transformed
European nations into civil societies and the “splitting” or splintering of the individual’s place
within the group. The concept of “deficiency” implies a lack, and in this context, many Marxist
theorists after Marx, specifically Louis Althusser, have commonly interpreted such a lack as a tool
by which those in power had reinforced relations of exploitation in historical societies.69 One may
interpret Europe’s split into a secularized, civil society – in the Marxian context – as an example
of the way in which the newest alienating institution, civil society, could even alienate religious
institutions themselves. Again calling upon the concept of Gattungswesen, Marx describes how
the Enlightenment and political emancipation of the 18th century changed even religion as an
institution of identification for humans: “[Die Religion] ist nicht mehr der Geist des Staats, wo der
Mensch - wenn auch in beschränkter Weise, unter besonderer Form und in einer besondern Sphäre
- sich als Gattungswesen verhält, in Gemeinschaft mit andern Menschen, sie ist zum Geist der
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft geworden, der Sphäre des Egoismus. . . Sie ist nicht mehr das Wesen
der Gemeinschaft, sondern das Wesen des Unterschieds. Sie ist zum Ausdruck der Trennung des
Menschen von seinem Gemeinwesen, von sich und den andern Menschen geworden - was sie
ursprünglich war [emphasis in original].”70 Once again, the splintering of a constructed, previously
unified form of human identification underlies the text as the standard by which one should have
judged Marx’s contemporary society. Marx describes a civil society as trivializing religion into a
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mere source of identity for disparate peoples, similar to the situation in North America (as Marx
described it).71
Artemy Magun describes Marx’s position in his response to the Judenfrage, analyzing how
the modern secularized state affects religious individuals spiritually, according to Marx:
“[Emancipation of religions from the state] is just a question of the liberty of man as an isolated
monad, withdrawn into himself. Analogously, the separation of the state from religion leads, not
to freedom from religion, but to freedom for (one’s particular) religion. Thus, the ‘human rights’
sanctify the ‘civil society’ of atomized individuals who live their own particular life and are united
at the top by the state, in an external way only.”72 The secular state influences religious individuals
externally in that their inner Gattungswesen, which opposes what Magun describes as “isolated
monads,” is still divided and alienated from such religious adherents. As Marx states, religion was
even an apparatus through which human beings identified with each other as social creatures,
through their Gemeinwesen. In other words, although Marx recognized the good intentions of the
Enlightenment concept of the separation of church and state, he nonetheless also acknowledged
the impotence of such a doctrine, in that human beings do not emancipate themselves from religion
per se; by separating state from church, religious institutions possess the opportunity to now
become even more influential and relevant than before, as they are not bound by a religious
monopoly of the state (e.g. state-endorsed Protestantism in 18th-century Prussia). Whether or not
intentional, by asserting that religion in a civil society is a tool of differentiation instead of common
heritage, Marx indirectly suggests not only that civil society has trivialized religion but also that
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religion (or a form thereof) may be considered part of the schema of a reconstituted Gattungswesen
or Gemeinwesen once a future material change in society occurred.
In the writings of Marx there is also a specific rhetoric of freedom – again, arguing for
sufficiency – which differs from the “liberty” rhetoric of the Enlightenment, in that the new
rhetoric advances the idea of political emancipation even further as far as human emancipation (a
concept which was already present in Marx’s thought by the time he wrote his response to the
Judenfrage). Thornhill writes that Marx “argued that the critical analysis of alienation is a
precondition of human freedom and self-realization, and that human freedom is obtained through
a recuperation of the conditions allowing the elaboration of species-being. . . In contrast to the
Young Hegelians, however, Marx clearly saw capitalism, not religion, as the source of human
alienation, and he interpreted alienation as a primarily material, not spiritual, condition.”73 Marx’s
position requires a “recuperation,” action as opposed to a static analysis of reality. Thornhill goes
on to write: “In Marx’s analysis, capitalism takes the place of metaphysics as the cause of human
impoverishment. However, this does not mean that Marx did not see capitalism as obtaining
metaphysical features or as possessing the nihilistic consequences originally imputed to
metaphysics. On the contrary, his work might be seen to hinge on the intimation that the adequately
modern critique of metaphysics must either be a critique of capitalism or it must resign itself to
remain metaphysical.”74 Thornhill does not easily dismiss the foretaste of Marx’s insight into the
psychological effects of capitalism on the laborer, or on humanity in general.
However, that Marx “clearly” viewed capitalism as the ultimate source of alienation is
debatable, for Marx considered religion and capitalism to differ in organization but be similar in
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their effects on the lowest socioeconomic group. Both institutions limit self-determination,
reinforcing the inherent inadequacies of humans (in religion) and dehumanizing social conditions
(in capitalism). Although capitalism remained Marx’s final object of criticism after the publication
of Das Kapital, I reiterate that this criticism owes much to the foundational criticism of religion in
which Marx engaged as a student in Berlin.75 The splintering of human nature occurred first and
foremost, according the younger Marx, through religion – particularly since capitalism in Marx’s
time was a fairly recent phenomenon in the whole of recorded European history – and the analysis
of this “splintering” and alienation emerged from a specifically German theological discourse.
Marx later came to view religion as part of a greater economic superstructure, stating that the ruling
ideas of any time period are always the ideas of the ruling class.76 Tucker even admits that Marx
played with the categories of religion and capitalism in his thought, writing that for Marx,
capitalism “is that which he has always considered it to be: the theology of the worldly god. Capital
treats of capitalism as a quasi-religious phenomenon.”77 Conversely, even Marx’s own political
theory and ethical project retained religious aspects in order to attract those most disenfranchised
by the modern, (religious or capitalistic) splintering way of life.
Marx responded to the idea of human deficiency and attempted to reinstate human
sufficiency using religious tones. Ola Sigurdson suggests that“…I would suggest that theology and
Marxism have always shared an interest in what I would call hope: a mutual expectation, beyond
mere wishful thinking, that something new is possible, a better society than the current alienated
and social existence of humankind. Theology and Marxism are both expressions of human
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dissatisfaction with contemporary conditions.”78 Most of Marx’s intellectual work was devoted to
analyzing the mechanisms of capitalism, but there nonetheless appeared an ethical component to
what came to be known as Marxism. Cyril Smith defines Marx’s task as the following: “Marx’s
problem was to discover the possibility for humanity, individually and collectively, to take
conscious charge of its own life, and to find this possibility within bourgeois society. Communism
would mean that humans would cease to be prisoners of their social relations, and begin
purposively to make their own history. In other words, we should cease to be mere objects and
start to live as subjects.”79 Here it is necessary to point out that it is far too simplistic an
interpretation to simply equate Marxism with a Christian or Judaic worldview, since Marxism in
the political sense necessitates that religious institutions, as institutions which perpetuate alienation
and exercise control through clerics, must no longer exist. Still, we know that as Marx viewed
history, the processes of history would resolve in the future into a world of justice through the
dialectic. Justice entails the resolution of conflict, and at the core of Marx’s theory of class conflict,
the contradictions within capitalism would resolve themselves into a classless society, in which no
exploitation ever occurs.
As early as 1954, Protestant writers John Dillenberger and Claude Welch passed the
following judgment on Marx’s theories:
…the Marxist vision of a perfect society corresponded to (and had its roots in) the Christian
hope for the kingdom of God on earth. In this respect particularly, Marxism has often been
called a ‘Christian heresy.’ Like the idea of progress, the Marxist view of history as moving
toward the final climax of judgment and fulfillment was ultimately derived from the
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Christian theology of history. In Marxism, this hope was stripped of its religious
foundation, historical necessity was substituted for the will of God, and judgment and
fulfillment were translated into economic terms. But even this version of the hope for the
kingdom symbolized clarity in the recognition of social evil, confidence that the movement
of history was toward the establishment of justice, and a prophetic denunciation of the idols
of free enterprise.80
Dillenberger and Welch describe the eschatological aspects of Marxism from a Christian
perspective, claiming that Marxism acted as a substitution for the promise of future justice assured
by the Christian faith (theologically, by the Last Judgment). Dillenberger and Welch had a stake
in arguing that Marx utilized a Christian framework, as both writers were theologians. However,
by escalating their theological critique and reiterating Marxism as a “Christian heresy,” they touch
upon the latent optimism in Marx’s theories. The view of history in scientific socialism, as opposed
to utopian socialism, asserts that the processes of history will not only lead to the “end of history”
but that they will also lead to an age of victory for the laborer.
There are countless theorist who have depicted Marx’s view of the future as a type of
secularized theology.81 Roland Boer takes a stance against such theorists who, according to him,
attempt to reduce Marx’s theories to an eschatological framework. First, Boer describes the
ambiguous collective German attitude concerning religion, as communist movements in Germany
were not nearly as anti-religious as those in France and Anglophone nations.82 He describes how
the Bible became a tool of public debate on all topics, which sheds light on the fact that Bruno
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Bauer, for example, began his career as a professor of theology, albeit that he was a self-proclaimed
atheist. Boer, in effect, argues that Marx and Engels did not intentionally or unintentionally
appropriate a Christian eschatological framework for their theories, but rather that Moses Hess and
other communists of their day convoluted Marx’s theories into such. He also points out the
particularly Christian nature of utopian socialism that emanated from France at the time of Marx’s
early criticism, particularly that of Saint-Simon.83 Boer finally writes: “In fact, those who charge
Marx and Engels with a secularized apocalyptic framework have the wrong target in their sights.
The charge applies not to Marx and Engels, but to the likes of Moses Hess and other early
communists to whom Marx and Engels were opposed.”84
I propose, however, that Marx and Engels did unconsciously draw from a type of reformed
eschatology, and I assert this within the framework of the action of re-consolidating the contents
of “heaven” and “earth” (Himmel/Erde). Anna Glazova and Paul North write:
When Marx reformulated human history as the progress of productive forces, he denied
even the theological cliché to which Feuerbach had still been committed, the transcendental
subject. Human beings are not the subjects of but subjected to history; their fate is decided
by the productive forces that develop through them but nonetheless also, until the
revolution at least, stand largely outside their control. This idea makes Marx’s model of
history appear at times more rather than less messianic; class society lives toward an event
in the history of productive forces that it cannot foresee. At most moments Marx believed
this event to be the proletarian revolution and its driving force the class with nothing to
lose – i.e., the one free of possessions. In some respects this class can seem like Marx’s
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messiah, the one that does not act at all in history except to bring it to an end.
Antitheological as it was, Marx’s model of history nevertheless at times relies on and often
seems to prefer an extra-historical, eschatological force.85
Rosfeld even writes in his biography of Marx: “Paradoxically, the museum curators who kept the
eschatological flame in the secular 19th century were not so much the great theologians but the
worldly-pious atheists like Marx – and Nietzsche.”86 Boer, however, resists a reductionist,
theological, eschatological version of Marxism which theologians have expounded, in my opinion,
so that he may resist the theologians’ reductionist labeling of a whole school of thought. What he
touches upon is the tendency and danger within 20th-century historiography to reframe Marxism
as a politicized source of knowledge for theologians – an attempt to claim that theological currents
lie at the basis of all philosophy and political movements.87
Boer nevertheless admits the limitations of anti-eschatological analyses of Marxian
theories, writing that “it may well be objected that even though Marx and Engels obviously do not
appropriate an eschatological perception of history from Judaism or Christianity, they may have
absorbed it through a process resembling osmosis, unaware that this was taking place.”88 We
cannot know the exact intention of Marx or Engels, nor would it aid us in analyzing the theories
and texts as they present themselves. If anything, Marx unknowingly appropriated elements of
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such an eschatological framework to further his rhetoric of heaven and earth. Boer claims that the
true targets of an accusation of eschatology is Moses Hess and early communists, but I believe that
this unspoken eschatology was necessary to fuel the way in which Marxist theory functioned as a
tool of mobilization. The unspoken intention of mobilizing the masses through socialist rhetoric
was precisely overcoming not only the ultimately ineffective political emancipation of the
Enlightenment but also the belief of deficiency of human beings to capture their menschliche
Emanzipation. Whether or not there is an inherent eschatology, the “career” of Marx’s worldview
in his lifetime as a means of mobilization presents a curious problem between theory and practice.
The “religious” appears in Marx’s ethical imperatives in terms of action. His answer to the
way in which mankind should redeem themselves presents somewhat of a contradiction in terms
of how adherents should act to achieve such a goal of redemption. It must be said here, however,
that Marx came to oppose those activists known as utopian socialists, the most prominent being
Charles Fourier and Robert Owen. David Leopold prefers to highlight how Marx often viewed
utopian socialism optimistically, writing that “Marx is more approving of [the utopian socialists’]
‘criticism’ than of their ‘systems’.”89 Leopold also points out that whereas Marx criticized later
utopian socialists, he did not exclusively place blame on earlier utopian socialists: “The intellectual
formation of this first generation of utopian socialists, Marx maintains, took place at a time when
both the material conditions were underdeveloped and not yet readily apparent.” 90 The material
conditions for intellectual formation of socialists was vital for Marx, who did not believe that
humans were totally at the mercy of historical processes but rather that the economic base asserts
itself in the end. The efforts of utopian socialists preceding them were well-intentioned, but Marx
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and Engels objected to utopian socialism in viewing it as another pathway to reinforce the
supremacy of the bourgeoisie, as the majority of these movements resulted in communes organized
by wealthy bourgeois. Marx’s addition to the social “gospel” of the 19th-century was imbued with
a particular intellectualism and certainly an intellectual hue that was not as significant in other
strains of the labor movement.
Marx’s career as a constant writer and revolutionary socialist within the framework of
scientific socialism present issues in intention as well as identity. Engels distanced Marx’s theory
of history from utopian socialists by describing his socialism as “scientific,” in that the method of
analysis could predict the processes of history by applying the dialectic to historical events.91
Considering this, we know contrarily, through over 150 years of Marxist rhetoric, that Marxism as
a political movement is not one of resignation or religious displacing, but of action. Again, there
appears to be a disconnect between the theory and Marx’s career as a revolutionary, such as his
membership in the First International. To the question of authorial intent in Marx’s texts, I believe
one must take a historical-critical approach to the text, due to the fact that Marx’s texts specifically
functioned as tools for the furthering of a specific political movement – socialism. Although
suggesting that socialism is “scientific” and that the advent of a revolution is “inevitable,” Marx
himself did not suggest an attitude of resignation. He writes as early as the Thesen über Feuerbach:
“Die materialistische Lehre, dass die Menschen Produkte der Umstände und der Erziehung,
veränderte Menschen also Produkte anderer Umstände und geänderter Erziehung sind, vergisst,
dass die Umstände eben von den Menschen verändert werden. . . Das Zusammenfallen des
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Aenderns der Umstände und der menschlichen Thätigkeit kann nur als umwälzende Praxis gefasst
und rationell verstanden werden.”92
On a theoretical level, Marx claims the ultimate agency of human beings (once the
economic base had asserted itself in a specific period of history) as part of his anthropological
analysis of human existence. There is also a great rhetorical weight behind the words “dass die
Umstände eben von den Menschen verändert werden”: although this is the early Marx
(approximately 27 years of age), he prepares the beginnings of the Marxian ethical project of
redeeming the downtrodden laborer, in the suggestion that human beings can change their material
circumstances. Marx criticizes Feuerbach throughout his theses in observing how Feuerbach
forgets the power of practical, sensuous human activity. He then writes as his eleventh thesis a
concise summary of his idea of ethical action: “Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur
verschieden interpretirt; es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern [emphasis in original].”93 This
call to action had finally came to a head by the 1848 revolutions in Europe, when Marx wrote the
final commandment and now-famous slogan of Marxist ideology at the end of the Manifest der
kommunistischen Partei: “Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!”94 Inherent in this statement is
the fact that Marx considered the processes of history not to be final in the implementation of
socialism throughout the world – it is the proletarian who must give the final push to start the
process toward a classless society. The statement also expresses the “dissatisfaction” with the
current state appearing both in Christianity and Marxism, as described by Sigurdson. At once this
is not a totally religious commandment, in the sense that an unseen force drives human beings
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through history. The commandment, however, does promise a telos, an end to revolution as a
means.
It is difficult whether or not to describe Marx as a moralist, although some theorists have
posited that Marx-as-writer and Marx-as-man had opposing views of the just nature of capitalism,
particularly Cohen.95 The “religious” in the actual, present class struggle of the 19th century lay in
resisting the dehumanizing conditions of capitalism. Sigurdson writes: “Rather than being
optimistic, then, Marxism should be considered to have a tragic sense of history. Again, this does
not necessarily mean that history will end badly but rather that whatever end there will be, this is
achieved through an excruciatingly high cost for humanity.”96 Marx does describe revolutionary
activities to achieve proletarian goals in violent terms – “[Die Kommunisten] erklären es offen,
dass ihre Zwecke nur erreicht werden können durch den gewaltsamen Umsturz aller bisherigen
Gesellschaftsordnung. Mögen die herrschenden Klassen vor einer kommunistischen Revolution
zittern”97 – but there is still an inherent Christian optimism in the theory that history necessarily
results in justice and that proletarians are in fact able to change their lot, and such an optimism
does not exist within an intellectual or religious vacuum. I also believe that attempts to resist a
teleological or eschatological interpretation of Marxism are based on the idea that Marx himself
predicted no “perfect” society or conditions after the ultimate communist revolution. I assert
contrarily that the goal of the end of history was not for Marx to describe a “how it will be,” but
rather to create a society in which human beings could assert their sufficiency to direct the path of
their own existence as subjects. The “powers” inherent in human beings, oppressed and denied by
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the mechanisms of capitalism, will have a chance to flourish in a “society” (truly a classless
existence) without economic restraints.98
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V. A Marx-Nietzsche Dialogue: The Rhetoric of Slavery
At the core of the philosophies of both Marx and Nietzsche, the principal task is to recover
and redeem man from all the doctrines and apparatuses which reinforce the supposed inborn and
imposed deficiency of the human being. Each philosopher depicts the false deficiency in varying
styles; Marx presents doctrines of deficiency as part of the entire exterior structure of society,
relying on a Materialist approach. Nietzsche, on the other hand, seeks the inner – perhaps
psychological – effects of the spiritual state of the West and how traditional Christian morality
views humans (as incomplete beings). A somewhat neglected aspect of the rhetoric used by Marx
and Engels is that of framing the situation of the common laborer as “slavery.” This slavery
rhetoric appears in several works of Marx and Engels and functions almost as a “shaming” force
in the sphere of political action; Marx and Engels were, in fact, familiar with the harsh labor
conditions of their day, although there is a deeper emotional aspect to this rhetoric of slavery which
may have been unknown to the authors themselves. I hold that the psychological methodology of
Nietzsche intersects with the external motivation of Marxist doctrines of political action. At the
time Marx published the first volume of Das Kapital in 1867, chattel slavery had disappeared from
the United States and still existed in several colonies around the world. 99 However, the slavery
which Marx and Engels address in their texts is a rhetorical, psychological form of slavery, a form
of slavery by default in the situation of the worker. “Slavery” in its rhetorical form in Marx and
Engels serves as an extreme type of description of the laborer’s state to emphasize the laborer’s
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own helplessness, and the intersection of the abstract, philosophical aspects of Marxism and how
to apply it in practical, human activity necessitate such a rhetoric of slavery.
The theme of slavery, a brutal reality of the 19th century, did not ultimately reflect the way
in which power apparatuses affected the European mentality psychologically. Nietzsche’s mixing
of historical, philological, and theological methods of analysis in his Genealogie der Moral led
him to describe, in his own terminology, the slave revolt in morality. This slave revolt in morality,
according to Nietzsche, was the way in which ancient “weaker” peoples, especially Jews, redetermined the West’s original values and, through this process, created the new moral category
of “evil.”100 Nietzsche describes the Jewish people as having been particularly refined in creating
a non-physical mode of regulating actions: “die Juden, jenes priesterliche Volk, das sich an seinen
Feinden und Überwältigern zuletzt nur durch eine radikale Umwerthung von deren Werthen, also
durch einen Akt der geistigsten Rache Genugthuung zu schaffen wusste.”101 This insight of
Nietzsche’s displays his profoundly aristocratic mode of thinking: through the slave revolt in
morality, primitive weaker peoples asserted their power against a Darwinian-like sense of
competition between the strong and the weak, although Nietzsche remains, in the end, with a
resounding why. With the power to brand the strong as “evil,” the weak set up an egalitarian mode
of guilt against a type of individualistic, self-centered (not in the sense of “selfish” but rather the
self as center) morality. In addition, Nietzsche admits that the slave revolt in morality has remain
with the West and influence our morality because of its triumph.102
In the majority of the texts of Marx and Engels which describe slaves and slavery, the word
“slave” defines those persons who are deficient as products of the particular material circumstances
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in which they live. The biblical precedent seems to be the story of the Hebrew slaves’ exodus from
Egypt, led by Moses, the Hebrew Testament’s most prominent messianic figure. It is nevertheless
too simplistic of a genealogy to claim any authority of this tale on the social movements of the 19th
century, but the narrative of “messiah who delivers slaves out of bondage” figures most
prominently in the Western, Judeo-Christian tradition, and in many ways, the Christian New
Testament doctrine of Christ-as-savior cannot be understood outside this Mosaic context. Again,
Marx himself must have found value in his perpetual labors as a revolutionary, as he devoted the
majority of his life the cause of the worker, living in poverty in London whilst researching for Das
Kapital. Marx uses the word “slave” at the end of the first section of the Manifest, “Bourgeois und
Proletarier”: “Es tritt hiermit offen hervor, dass die Bourgeoisie unfähig ist, noch länger die
herrschende Klasse der Gesellschaft zu bleiben und die Lebensbedingungen ihrer Klasse der
Gesellschaft als regelndes Gesetz aufzuzwingen. Sie ist unfähig zu herrschen, weil sie unfähig ist,
ihrem Sklaven die Existenz selbst innerhalb seiner Sklaverei zu sichern, weil sie gezwungen ist,
ihn in eine Lage herabsinken zu lassen, wo sie ihn ernähren muss, statt von ihm ernährt zu
werden.”103 Finally, there is the optimistic “prophecy” at the manifesto’s finale: “Die Proletarier
haben nichts in [einer kommunistischen Revolution] zu verlieren als ihre Ketten. Sie haben eine
Welt zu gewinnen.”104 One can certainly interpret such statements within a religious framework
of promise. Behind the lofty rhetoric of Marx and Engels here, there lies a certainty in the processes
of history and an optimism in the continuous dissatisfaction of the common laborer. Regardless of
how history played out after Marx’s death, “Sie haben eine Welt zu gewinnen” implies that the
contemporary world belong to the capitalist, but only for a limited time.
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Four years before Marx published the Manifest in London, the young Engels, himself
stemming from a German family of textile manufacturers, had observed and recording the labor
conditions of the British working class, particularly in Liverpool and Manchester, while on
business for his father’s cotton mill in Manchester in 1844; his observations became his text which
influenced the ethical vision of Marxist theories, Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England.
What Engels observes through his first-hand experience in English factories is not wholly divorced
from the emotionally driven rhetoric he utilizes: “Die Sklaverei, in der die Bourgeoisie das
Proletariat gefesselt hält, kommt nirgends deutlicher ans Tageslicht als im Fabriksystem. Hier hört
alle Freiheit rechtlich und faktisch auf. Der Arbeiter muß morgens um halb sechs in der Fabrik
sein - kommt er ein paar Minuten zu spät, so wird er gestraft, kommt er zehn Minuten zu spät, so
wird er gar nicht hineingelassen, bis das Frühstück vorüber ist, und verliert einen Vierteltag am
Lohn.”105 Engels starkly differentiates himself and his ethical perspectives from any Nietzschean
emphasis on the good as strong.
Engels then states bluntly: “Der Proletarier ist also rechtlich und tatsächlich der Sklave der
Bourgeoisie; sie kann über sein Leben und seinen Tod verfügen.”106 Later, he writes a similar
sentiment: “Der Arbeiter ist rechtlich und faktisch Sklave der besitzenden Klasse, der Bourgeoisie,
so sehr ihr Sklave, daß er wie eine Ware verkauft wird, wie eine Ware im Preise steigt und fällt.”107
In the same section, Engels pinpoints the contemporary issue with rhetorical straightforwardness:
“Der ganze Unterschied gegen die alte, offenherzige Sklaverei ist nur der, daß der heutige Arbeiter
frei zu sein scheint, weil er nicht auf einmal verkauft wird, sondern stückweise, pro Tag, pro
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Woche, pro Jahr, und weil nicht ein Eigentümer ihn dem andern verkauft, sondern er sich selbst
auf diese Weise verkaufen muß, da er ja nicht der Sklave eines einzelnen, sondern der ganzen
besitzenden Klasse ist.”108 Engels therefore acknowledges that, while the modern laborer may
appear to have more agency in determining a course of employment, the laborer is ultimately
bound to the capitalist as an object which the capitalist may exploit; the laborer lives as a slave.
Marx also employs such rhetoric of slavery most explicitly in the first volume of Das
Kapital. He writes the following on the situation of the common worker under capitalism:
Wenn der Arbeiter ursprünglich seine Arbeitskraft an das Kapital verkauft, weil ihm die
materiellen Mittel zur Produktion einer Ware fehlen, versagt jetzt seine individuelle
Arbeitskraft selbst ihren Dienst, sobald sie nicht an das Kapital verkauft wird. Sie
funktioniert nur noch in einem Zusammenhang, der erst nach ihrem Verkauf existiert, in
der Werkstatt des Kapitalisten. Seiner natürlichen Beschaffenheit nach verunfähigt, etwas
Selbständiges zu machen, entwickelt der Manufakturarbeiter produktive Tätigkeit nur noch
als Zubehör zur Werkstatt des Kapitalisten. Wie dem auserwählten Volk auf der Stirn
geschrieben stand, daß es das Eigentum Jehovas, so drückt die Teilung der Arbeit dem
Manufakturarbeiter einen Stempel auf, der ihn zum Eigentum des Kapitals brandmarkt.109
If any person be deficient – in the sense of missing essential components of their human essence
– it is the laborer, in that the capitalist mode of production splinters his labor gradually. The laborer,
being splintered and alienated from his labor, becomes a mechanism of the machine of the factory.
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Marx, oscillating between economic theory and social criticism, describes in dire terms the
pressure driving the modern laborer: “[Die Maschinerie] revolutioniert ebenso von Grund aus die
formelle Vermittlung des Kapitalverhältnisses, den Kontrakt zwischen Arbeiter und Kapitalist.
Auf Grundlage des Warenaustausches war es erste Voraussetzung, daß sich Kapitalist und Arbeiter
als freie Personen, als unabhängige Warenbesitzer, der eine Besitzer von Geld und
Produktionsmitteln, der andre Besitzer von Arbeitskraft, gegenübertraten. Aber jetzt kauft das
Kapital Unmündige oder Halbmündige. Der Arbeiter verkaufte früher seine eigne Arbeitskraft,
worüber er als formell freie Person verfügte. Er verkauft jetzt Weib und Kind. Er wird
Sklavenhändler.”110 Marx’s methodology of comparing historical precedents with contemporary
conditions reflects Engels’ earlier methodology while observing working conditions in England.
Here, however, Marx invokes the affective aftertaste of sacrifice – the laborer, himself a slave,
must now commodify his own family members for capitalist producers. There must nonetheless
be an underlying emotional force which transfers the identification of the incongruities under
capitalism to a state in which the exploited laborer may publicly object to such undesirable
conditions.
Marx’s task in Das Kapital was to describe how the capitalist mode of production
functions, although he also latently analyzes how such conditions of capitalism affect the worker’s
inner, psychological state. Nietzsche identifies the driving force of the slave revolt in morality to
be ressentiment. Nietzsche does not only describe ressentiment as a static state of dissatisfaction.
He states: “Der Sklavenaufstand in der Moral beginnt damit, dass das Ressentiment selbst
schöpferisch wird und Werthe gebiert.”111 The feeling of helplessness in the “weaker’ peoples of
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antiquity now had the power, according to Nietzsche, to change the spectrum of values in the West
and create a new standard of morality based on a psychological measuring of human actions. The
slave revolt in morality transposed any claim to rule through physical force into the power to rule
psychologically through a guilt-based morality. R. Lanier Anderson writes: “Even more important
in Nietzsche’s eyes, of course, the slave morality also promotes a spirit of righteous indignation
against the happy and fortunate world, simultaneously encouraging and giving vent to ressentiment
in the weak. Thus, the slave morality is justly so called because it answers to the ‘needs’ of the
slave type, and these selling points promote its spread and institutional consolidation.”112 Marx
and Engels considered the contemporary factory worker to be such a “slave type,” one who
requires liberation from the shackles of the capitalist system. Above all, Marx and Engels
fundamentally wished to redirect the feelings of ressentiment, albeit that they rested such a belief
on the idea of the infallibility of the proletariat in its intentions: Marx ultimately fashions the
proletariat into a holy body of human beings, equipped with the tools to recognize their own
deficiency and to prepare to assert their own sufficiency as subjects after the “end of history.”
What separates Marx as a figure of the 19th century from preceding “priests” was the
location of the predicted outcome of history. Nietzsche criticizes the agenda of the “ascetic priest”
in the Genealogie der Moral in its third treatise, “Was bedeuten asketische Ideale?” He writes, for
instance, that the ascetic priest “ist der fleischgewordne Wunsch nach einem Anders-sein,
Anderswo-sein, und zwar der höchste Grad dieses Wunsches, dessen eigentliche Inbrunst und
Leidenschaft: aber eben die Macht seines Wünschens ist die Fessel, die ihn hier anbindet, eben
damit wird er zum Werkzeug, das daran arbeiten muss, günstigere Bedingungen für das Hiersein
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und Mensch-sein zu schaffen.”113 This Anders-sein and Anderswo-sein lies at the foundation of
traditionally religious answers to the question of toil and production in human life: one must place
his or her hope in an afterlife in order to be content with earthly life. Marx abhorred such a
mentality and viewed it as pure alienation from the Gattungswesen. It cannot be said, however,
that the alternative to labor conditions under capitalism, although certainly not the promise of a
heaven, does not inform the entire Marxist prediction of the future.
Nietzsche also describes the ascetic priest explicitly, stating: “Der asketische Priester muss
uns als der vorherbestimmte Heiland, Hirt und Anwalt der kranken Heerde gelten: damit erst
verstehen wir seine ungeheure historische Mission. . . der Priester ist der Richtungs-Veränderer
des Ressentiment.”114 The ascetic priest, instead of directing the ressentiment onto the oppressors
themselves, instructs his followers to direct ressentiment onto themselves – in the Christian context
through the concept of “sin.” The ascetic priest’s power, according to Nietzsche, derives not from
brute force, but psychologically from the very convincing of others of their own weakness. Peter
Poellner, in an attempt to capture Nietzsche’s disdain for ressentiment, writes that “in ressentiment,
the subject enacts a disposition in which a pain believed to have been caused by a ‘not-self’ is a
sufficient motive to negate that Other (to hate him, as Nietzsche puts it more bluntly). But this
negation, as we have seen, takes a very distinctive form. . . In ressentiment, a deficiency
experienced in relation to another subject is thus implicitly taken as sufficient to reject the values
in terms of which that Other understands himself.”115 Applying this to the social criticism of Marx
and Engels in the 19th century, any observer of dehumanizing labor conditions would have had
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sufficient reason to reject the values of the class of capitalists. Marx viewed priests and clerics as
those who exploit the poorest in society to reinforce their status as part of the ideological
superstructure: by promising the worker the paradise of an afterlife, such a hope in an afterlife and
displacing of energies leave open the door for members of the superstructure to exploit those
underneath.
Nietzsche finally asks, “Ist er aber eigentlich ein Arzt, dieser asketische Priester?. . . Nur
das Leiden selbst, die Unlust des Leidenden wird von ihm bekämpft, nicht deren Ursache, nicht
das eigentliche Kranksein.”116 According to the way in which Nietzsche defines the ascetic priest,
Marx cannot be such a “priest.” Nevertheless, the whole of the Marxist push to furnish ameliorated
living conditions for the working class combined with a Materialist worldview presents a specific
19th-century break with preceding traditional forms of eschatological and psychological
displacements of ressentiment as a means of alleviating the feelings of inadequacy or pain, as
described by Nietzsche. Marx and Engels necessarily had to address the working class for which
they labored in the tone of one who addresses slaves, as characterizing them as slaves was essential
to their ethical project; otherwise, no specific social movement for change could have taken place.
Marx, in the last analysis, served to redirect the feelings of ressentiment present in the proletariat
of his day, in that he suggested that it finally redirect such feelings back onto the true, original
source of oppression and feelings of deficiency – the bourgeoisie.
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VI. Conclusion
Marx and Nietzsche, of all German philosophers, represent even today some of the most
systematically anti-religious viewpoints ever expounded in the history of Western thought, and
their reputations ultimately do not and cannot escape such phrases as “Religion is the opium of the
people” or “God is dead.” Yet, conversely, their pedigrees of religious piety present a dilemma in
understanding both figures in a context of such developed and systematic atheism. This irony
characterizes not only the German philosophical field in which both philosophers wrote, but also
the irony inherent in how we search for meaning after abandoning the central feature of Western
culture and source of meaning for thousands of years, reflected in the death of God. Considering
the less-than-positive way in which modern observers have depicted Nietzsche and Marx in
popular and religious settings, it can nevertheless not be stated that both philosophers were fully
devoid of religion in their intentions and the stylistic nuances of their writings. Marx’s complex
relationship to the idea of the “religious” presents a moral dilemma when depicting him in infernal
scenes of suffering. After all, the young Marx and his fellow Young Hegelians drew the idea of
“becoming godlike” from a kind of inverted theology of Hegel’s own depiction of God. I newly
interpret Marx as well as Nietzsche in the wake of the ideas of religious alienation of Feuerbach,
who set the tone for a further flourishing of German philosophy in the study of religion per se and
its effects on human beings. Both Nietzsche and Marx grappled with the way in which humans
could affirm their own sufficiency as subjects in history and as creators of meaning for themselves
in a post-religious era. However, it cannot be ignored that there are deep religious implications in
both thinkers’ writings and cultural criticism of the German intellectual environment throughout
the 19th century.
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Analysis of the mechanisms of religious language and rhetoric in the texts of Nietzsche
and Marx exposes the term “atheist” as somewhat ambiguous and deceptive, in that such a label is
fraught with political and social implications that exist outside the theorizing of German thinkers
in the early 19th century. Nietzsche’s reputation as the “atheist” philosopher who announced the
death of God becomes a convoluted issue when considering his preoccupation with Christianity
and his admiration for the gods of Ancient Greece. Not only this, but Nietzsche also grappled with
the nihilistic philosophical views of his day, asserting that there must be something rather nothing
to human life: the void described by Nietzsche left a wide spiritual gap for Europe entering the
20th century. Nietzsche naturally had no control over the legacy of his work, and as Steven
Aschheim points out, the tendency to interpret Nietzschean doctrines religiously and assimilate
such doctrines into German Protestant theology occurred commonly in such circles in the early
20th century. Inherent in the idea that “God is dead” is not that God never existed but that God did
live and died.
Several scholars have also depicted Marx’s theories as eschatological and teleological,
although there is a temptation in framing Marx as a prophetic voice to play into the critiques of
theologians, particularly those with a Marxism post-Marx in mind. Regardless of the historical
tainting of an ideology, Marxism contains an inherent religious hope, as Sigurdson states, in the
belief that justice is a reliable force in history and that history will result in the resolving of
conflicts, or justice. Nevertheless, I believe there to be a break or “change” in the 19th century
German philosophical context with previous modes of philosophical thought which one must
consider. It is within this break with previous philosophical thought that thinkers such as Marx and
Nietzsche formulated ways in which the deficiency of those they addressed is not recycled. In
other words, Marx and Nietzsche may be considered examples of the anti-Socratic philosopher.
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Such an anti-Socratic philosopher is not stuck within the cycle of perpetuating the supposed
deficiency of those he or she addresses, but rather such a philosopher (as Marx and Nietzsche
attempted in the 19th century) strives to dismantle the power apparatuses and frameworks of
thought which reproduce anew the supposed deficiency of the “auditors.”
The search for the “religious” in the texts of Marx and Nietzsche leads to the rhetoric of
slaves and slavery, and such a rhetoric functioned ultimately to describe, historically, the
conditions which both philosophers witnessed in contemporary Europe. Through the frame of
Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral, Marx appears as the final priest and director of
ressentiment – Marx’s task historically and philosophically heightened the necessity to redirect
ressentiment onto the oppressors as the signal for the modern age, breaking with traditional
internalizations of ressentiment. Undeniable now is the way in which such feelings of ressentiment
played directly into the social engagement of socialists in Marx’s day, and how the feelings of
ressentiment, as a powerful emotional force in human history, may still shape the way in which
we view ourselves as a species today. The break with German Protestant and general theological
traditions is palpable in the writings of Marx and Nietzsche, yet there is still a carryover from what
I consider the “religious” – the framework of action within which Luther led the Reformation and
within which Marx and Nietzsche worked to form the conditions, intellectually and materially, for
human beings to assert their sufficiency and wholeness as rational humans.
The “religious,” I suggest, deserves further investigation as a category of religious thought
outside the historical religions with which Marx and Nietzsche engaged. In light of this carryover
from the institutions of religion into political and philosophical thought of the 19th century, we
thus must not conclude that the modern Western world can ignore the impact of religious thought
within its development. Reflecting Conway, we also gain a sense of the irony within the works of
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Marx and Nietzsche. Although against the religions of their day, the theories of both thinkers
suggest a reliance upon previously existing religious frameworks to build further philosophical
thought, especially in the German philosophical scene of the 19th century. By examining the
eschatological aspects of Marx and the homage-parodies of Nietzsche in Also sprach Zarathustra,
I point out the nuances of the term “atheist” and how and why it, again, is a problematic label.
Considering that the course of German philosophy led by Marx and Nietzsche took a particularly
anti-religious turn in the 19th century, there is still necessarily a reliance to old religious forms,
whether parodying them or defining philosophical movements in opposition to them (for instance,
Marx’s goal to transform criticism). In a Feuerbachian sense, one may further question whether or
not such an anthropological drive to create religious belief systems can be shaken from the
processes of thought in the Western world. Whether or not explicitly stated, such religious
categories of thought as a tool of self-actualization are apparent, even in opposition, in the
“improvement-moralities” of Marx and Nietzsche. We should ultimately resist the labels of
“atheist” for both thinkers – or at least explore the nuance of such a term when applied to either
thinker – and instead investigate the further the uses of the religious aspects inherent in their texts
and the social and intellectual movements which succeeded them. This reevaluation of atheism
and the effectiveness of religious rhetoric can lead to a more scholarly, demystified way in which
to discover the “divine creativity” in humankind.

65

Bibliography

66

Anastaplo, George. The Christian Heritage: Problems and Prospects. Lanham, MD: Lexington,
2010.
Anderson, R. Lanier. “On the nobility of Nietzsche’s priests.” In Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy
of Morality: A Critical Guide, edited by Simon May, 24-55. Cambridge, Cambridge UP,
2011.
Aschheim, Steven. “After the Death of God: Varieties of Nietzschean Religion.” In The
Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990, 201-231. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994.
Boer, Roland. “Marxism and Eschatology Reconsidered,” Meditations, 25 (2010): 39-59.
Brobjer, Thomas J. “Nietzsche’s Changing Relation with Christianity: Nietzsche as Christian,
Atheist, and Antichrist.” In Nietzsche and the Gods, edited by Weaver Santaniello, 137157. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.
Bronowski, Jacob and Bruce Mazlish. The Western Intellectual Tradition: From Leonardo to
Hegel. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
Cohen, G.A. Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001.
Conway, Daniel W. “Solving the Problem of Socrates: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra as Political
Irony.” Political Theory, 16 (1988): 257-280.
Dillenberger, John and Claude Welch, Protestant Christianity: Interpreted through Its
Development. New York: Scribner, 1945.
Engels, Friedrich. Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England. In Karl Marx, Friedrich
Engels: Werke. Band 2. Berlin: Dietz, 1974.
67

Franck, Didier. Nietzsche and the Shadow of God. Translated by Bettina Bergo and Philippe
Farah. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2012.
Glazova, Anna and Paul North. “Saving Hope, the Wager of Messianism.” In Messianic Thought
Outside Theology, edited by Anna Glazova and Paul North, 1-11. New York: Fordham
UP, 2014.
Hatab, Lawrence J. “Apollo and Dionysus: Nietzschean Expressions of the Sacred.” In Nietzsche
and the Gods, edited by Weaver Santaniello, 45-56. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2001.
Heidegger, Martin. “Nihilism and History of Being.” In Nietzsche, vol. 4, pt. 2, 210. Quoted in
Didier Franck, Nietzsche and the Shadow of God. Translated by Bettina Bergo and
Philippe Farah. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2012. 27.
Hosfeld Rolf. Karl Marx: An Intellectual Biography. New York: Berghahn, 2013.
Kouvelakis, Stathis. “Marx: Public Sphere to Revolutionary Democracy.” In Philosophy and
Revolution: From Kant to Marx, 232-336. New York: Verso, 2003.
Leopold, David. The Young Karl Marx: German Philosophy, Modern Politics, and Human
Flourishing. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007.
Loeb, Paul S. The Death of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010.
Marx, Karl. Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. In Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels:
Werke. Band 23. Berlin: Dietz, 1973.
------. “Thesen über Feuerbach.” In Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Werke. Band 3, 5-7. Berlin:
Dietz, 1973.
68

------. Zur Judenfrage. In Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Werke. Band 1, 347-377. Berlin: Dietz,
1974.
------. “Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung.” In Karl Marx, Friedrich
Engels: Werke. Band 3, 378-391. Berlin: Dietz, 1974.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. “Manifest der kommunistischen Partei.” In Karl Marx,
Friedrich Engels, Werke. Band 4, 459-493. Berlin: Dietz, 1974.
McLellan, David. Karl Marx: A Biography. 4th ed. New York: Palgrave, 2006.
------. Marx before Marxism. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
Mugan, Artemy. “Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt on the Jewish question: political theology as a
critique.” Continental Philosophy Review, 45 (2012): 545-568.
Mulhall, Stephen. “The promising animal: the art of reading On the Genealogy of Morality as
testimony.” In Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, edited by
Simon May, 234-264. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Brief an G. Krug und W. Pinder in Naumburg (Fragment).” In Friedrich
Nietzsche Briefe, Juni 1850-September 1864, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Montinari, 201-202. New York: De Gruyter, 1975.
------. Der Antichrist: Fluch auf das Christenthum. In Nietzsches Werke: Historisch-kritische
Ausgabe. Electronic Edition, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 163-252.
Charlottesville, VA: InteLex, 1995.

69

------. Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. In Nietzsches Werke: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe.
Electronic Edition, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 11-335.
Charlottesville, VA: InteLex, 1995.
------. Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik. In Nietzsches Werke: Historischkritische Ausgabe. Electronic Edition, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 5152. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex, 1995.
------. Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft. In Nietzsches Werke:
Historisch-kritische Ausgabe. Electronic Edition, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Montinari, 1-255. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex, 1995.
------. Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift. In Nietzsches Werke: Historisch-kritische
Ausgabe. Electronic Edition, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 257-430.
Charlottesville, VA: InteLex, 1995.
Poellner, Peter. “Ressentiment and morality.” In Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A
Critical Guide, edited by Simon May, 120-141. Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2011.
Reginster, Bernard. “The genealogy of guilt.” In Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A
Critical Guide, edited by Simon May, 56-77. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.
Sigurdson, Ola. Theology and Marxism in Eagleton and Žižek: A Conspiracy of Hope. New
York: Palgrave, 2012.
Smith, Cyril. “The Communist Manifesto after 150 Years.” In Karl Marx and the Future of the
Human, 25-42. New York: Lexington, 2005.

70

Smith, John H. “Nietzsche: Logos against Itself and the Death of God.” In Dialogues between
Faith and Reason: The Death and Return of God in Modern German Thought, 152-174.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2011.
Thornhill, Chris. “The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx.” In German Political Philosophy: The
Metaphysics of Law, 158-185. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1967.

71

Vita
Norman Rudolph Saliba was born in Memphis, Tennessee. He received a Bachelor of Arts in
Modern Foreign Languages and Literatures (German) with the distinction of magna cum laude
from Middle Tennessee State University in Murfreesboro, Tennessee in 2013. Saliba attended the
Fachbereich Translations-, Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft, a faculty of the University of Mainz,
in Germersheim, Germany in 2012. He also received a Master of Arts in Modern Foreign
Languages and Literatures (German) from the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, Tennessee in
2015. He is continuing his studies and commencing his doctorate in the Department of Germanic
and Slavic Languages at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. His research interests
include pre-war German-Jewish history, Marxism, early 20th century Austrian literature and
culture, and 19th century German philosophy.

72

